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INTRODUCTION
It has often been said that the criminal law is
concerned only with intent, not motive. According to
Jerome Hall, "hardly any part of the penal law is more
definitely settled than that motive is irrelevant."1 Alan
t University at Buffalo Distinguished Professor of Law. I am grateful to
Markus Dubber for innumerable suggestions, for listening patiently, and for
sharing his erudition. I also thank Jim Gardner and Bob Weisberg for extensive
comments; and Allison Danner, Antony Duff, Dan Kahan and Betty Mensch for
bibliographical help. Jennifer Johnson provided able research assistance. Errors
(and sins) remain mine.
1. Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 153 (1947).
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Norrie recently agreed: "It is as firmly established in legal
doctrine as any rule could be that motive is irrelevant to
responsibility."2 In the nineteenth century, juries were told
that they need not determine a defendant's motive to find
he had intentionally done wrong, and that a religious or
benevolent motive would not acquit him. Today, the
irrelevance of motive is invoked in construing the mental
element of offenses and in arguing about a broad array of
policy issues in the criminal law. Courts and
commentators incant the irrelevance of motive maxim in
arguing against hate-crimes liability, for mercy-killing
liability, against "transferring" intent from one victim or
offense to another, against some versions of the defenses of
necessity and provocation, and against criminal negligence.
Thus, the irrelevance of motive claim has become a
paradox: supposedly a fundamental principle of criminal
law, it is nevertheless said to conflict with many
established doctrines of criminal law.
This paradox is possible because motive and intent are
not stable concepts that pick out perspicuous features of
the world. Instead, the distinction between motive and
intent and the irrelevance of motive maxim are rhetorical
constructs: formulations rendered meaningful by their role
within a particular historically and institutionally situated
discursive practice.4 When the historical and institutional
context of such a discursive practice changes, a rhetorical
construct can change its function, or become vestigial. It
can thereby change its meaning, or be drained of meaning
altogether. Oddly, the irrelevance of motive maxim has
suffered both of these fates. This accounts for its
paradoxical quality. Over time, the irrelevance of motive
maxim has fragmented into two different propositions, one
lacking authority, and one lacking content.
2. Alan W. Norrie, Crime, Reason, and History: A Critical Introduction to
Criminal Law 37 (1993).
3. William Lawrence Clark & William L. Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of
Crimes 149-51 (1900).
4. See Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Literary Criticisms of the Law
292-377 (2000) for a fuller explication of the concept of a rhetoric.
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Thus, understanding the motive/intent distinction and
the irrelevance of motive maxim requires understanding
the changing context in which these rhetorical
constructions have been invoked. When legal scholars first
began to distinguish motive from intent, in the late
eighteenth century, courts still had the common law power
to create and define crimes. In making criminal law, courts
had to apply their views about the purposes of imposing
criminal liability and punishment, just as legislatures must
do today. But courts are in a different position than
legislatures, when they apply theories of punishment in
defining crimes. Legislatures typically act prospectively,
institutionalizing their values in formal standards and
procedures to be applied later by officials with limited
discretion. By contrast, courts typically act retrospectively,
judging cases that have already occurred. If courts are not
restrained by the obligation to apply legislatively imposed
standards, they may simply apply their values directly to
the facts of a given case. When law is made in the process
of adjudication, there are dangers that it will be applied
retroactively, and that like cases will be treated differently.
Thus, the original point of the irrelevance of motive
maxim was to urge courts to apply formal offense
definitions and to encourage legislatures to supply them.
Legal reformers associated "intentions" with behavior,
which could be compared to rules of conduct. By contrast,
they associated "motives" with character, which could only
be evaluated by discretionary moral judgment. Thus, the
irrelevance of motive maxim implied that courts should
assess behavior by applying conduct rules rather than by
engaging in discretionary moral judgment. An intention
was supposed to be somehow more legal than a motive and
the irrelevance of motive connoted fidelity to the principle
of legality. The motive/intent distinction was part of the
rhetoric of the rule of law in criminal law, and stood for a
particular allocation of discretion among courts and
legislatures.
But as courts and legislatures came to accept the
proposed division of their labor, the motive/intent
20021
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distinction could no longer carry the same meaning. When
legislatures already define offenses, there is no longer any
point in urging them to do so. Similarly, when courts
already apply legislative offense definitions, they need no
further encouragement. Once legislatures have undertaken
to define offenses, the important questions become what
offense definitions legislatures should supply and how
courts should apply them. If the irrelevance of motive
maxim has no implications for these questions, it no longer
has much to say to modern lawyers.
Thus, when twentieth century lawyers encountered
the irrelevance of motive maxim in older cases and
treatises, they naturally assumed it had something to say
about how to formulate and interpret offense definitions.
As a result, they interpreted the distinction between motive
and intent as a psychological distinction, among the kinds
of mental states that should inculpate offenders. But here
they faced the difficulty that the terms "intent" and
"motive" are used interchangeably in ordinary language.
These terms could only be distinguished as technical terms
of art.
Twentieth century legal scholars came up with three
different candidates for such a technical distinction
between intent and motive. According to one version,
intentions were cognitive states of mind, like expectations
or perceptions of risk. Motives, by contrast, were
desiderative states-desires, purposes, or ends. The
difficulty with this version of the distinction was that it
seemed to render the motive is irrelevant maxim
descriptively false, since criminal law often conditioned
liability on these desiderative states.
A second version of the distinction divided desiderative
states into immediate and remote goals, identifying
intention with the former and motive with the latter. The
difficulty with this version of the distinction was that any
act might be explained by not just two, but perhaps a very
great number of goals. Any goal might be denominated an
intention when compared to a more remote goal, and a
motivation when compared to a more immediate goal.
[Vol. 6:1
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In an effort to sort goals into just two categories, some
commentators suggested that intentions were only those
goals that were offense elements, while motives were any
more remote goals. This version of the motive/intent
distinction certainly accorded with the motive is irrelevant
maxim, but at the price of reducing it to an empty
tautology, true by definition.
If the motive is irrelevant maxim is true by definition,
it has no normative bite. If the only identifying
characteristic of motives is that they are not offense
elements, the irrelevance of motive maxim can tell us
nothing about how to define offenses. It can have no
implications regarding hate crimes, mercy killing,
transferred intent, necessity, provocation, or criminal
negligence. On the other hand, the irrelevance of motive
maxim will have law reform implications if we take it to
mean that criminal liability should never be predicated on
desiderative states. But this version of the irrelevance of
motive maxim has law reform implications only because it
is (and has long been) at odds with so much criminal law
doctrine. Thus, when understood in light of its origins and
development, the irrelevance of motive maxim is revealed
to now stand for two different principles, one lacking
normative content, and the other lacking legal authority.
Changes in the institutional context of the criminal law
have eliminated the conditions which made the irrelevance-
motive-maxim both a persuasive principle of law reform
and a meaningful decision rule for courts.
This article will explain the current predicament of the
rhetoric of motive and intent by exploring its origins and
changing context. Part one will consider the familiar claim
that the common law traditionally conditioned punishment
on evil motive. Finding little support for this claim, it will
suggest that it amounts to a sort of origin myth for modern
culpability analysis. Modern criminal law congratulates
itself for being technical, precise, liberal, and value free by
contrasting its limited inquiry into intent with the ancient
common law's supposedly searching inquiry into the moral
worth of defendant's motives.
20021
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Parts two and three will show that our received idea of
motive as a primitive form of culpability was developed in
the nineteenth century to contrast with a new idea of
criminal intent as an offense element. This contrast
between motive and intent drew on two related intellectual
movements of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. Part two will describe the early efforts of legal
scientists to discipline and organize a rapidly expanding
criminal law by analyzing offenses into their component
elements. This effort led to the widespread use of the
terminology of "intent" to refer to criminal culpability. Part
three will describe the effort of utilitarian reformers to
rationalize the criminal law as a system of legislatively
imposed deterrent sanctions. Utilitarians developed a
conception of motives as fixed features of human
psychology that the law could use in influencing behavior.
Both of these movements lent support to the idea that
criminal liability should be predicated on some particular
intent, but these two movements associated different
meanings with intent. To legal scientists, "intention"
connoted any legally defined mental state, while to
utilitarians "intentions" were cognitive states only, to be
contrasted with desires and motives.
Part four will show that by the late nineteenth
century, the irrelevance of motive had become a prominent
doctrine, invoked by courts and influential scholars. It
examines influential formulations of the maxim, by J.F.
Stephen and Oliver Wendell Holmes. Stephen exemplified
a legal scientist's concern with element analysis, while
Holmes urged the irrelevance of motive on utilitarian
grounds.
Part five considers logical, empirical, and normative
criticisms of the irrelevance of motive maxim developed
during the twentieth century. Critics claimed that motive
and intent were interchangeable terms for an offender's
purposes, and that criminal liability both does and should
depend on these purposes.
Finally, part six examines several efforts to apply the
irrelevance of motive maxim to contemporary doctrinal and
[Vol. 6:1
MOTIVE AND INTENT
policy issues, in light of these criticisms. These issues
include statutory construction; hate crimes; transferred
intent; and felony murder. This discussion is intended to
be illustrative rather than exhaustive. Its purpose is not to
resolve these contemporary policy debates, but to show that
the irrelevance of motive maxim contributes very little to
them, for reasons predicted by the logical, empirical, and
normative critiques discussed in part five.
This article concludes that the irrelevance of motive
maxim was a useful slogan in the nineteenth century
campaign for legislative definition of criminal offenses. But
with the success of that campaign, the irrelevance of
motive maxim has itself become irrelevant.
I. IS THERE AN "EVIL MOTIVE TRADITION" IN CRIMINAL
LAW?
It is sometimes argued that, over its history, the
criminal law has developed from an emphasis on motive to
a concern with intent. In his important article on motive,
The Mens Rea Enigma, Martin Gardner offers such a
thesis. Gardner argues that
the mens rea principle originally required that the
defendant perform the criminal act with an evil, wicked, or
immoral motive .... [T]his concept of mens rea was sensibly
abandoned at the offense definition level in favor of a more
structured system.... [that] links criminal liability to proof
that the defendant subjectively possessed a certain level of
culpability. This culpability level entails intentional action
coupled with awareness of the criminal consequences of the
action under the circumstances.5
Standard histories of the mens rea doctrine in the common
law of crimes support this claim. They suggest that while
the common law always conditioned criminal liability on
5. Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of
Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 635, 697
(footnotes omitted).
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mens rea, the content of this requirement has changed over
time. Originally, they claim, any evil motive accompanying
criminal action could supply the requisite mens rea. More
recently, however, only proof of intent to cause or risk some
particular proscribed harm could satisfy the requirement of
mens rea.
Albert Levitt introduced such an account in his 1922
article The Origin of the Doctrine of Mens Rea. Levitt
traced the requirement of mens rea to Roman Catholic
penitential practices. According to Levitt, the church from
the time of Augustine regarded evil motives as the sinful
aspect of wrongdoing:
To know if the things [men] do are truly good or evil, one
must know what motive animates their acts. The evil
motive makes the evil act; the good motive makes the good
act. It is for this reason that Augustine in his sermons
raises the question of the good or evil mind when discussing
perjury. He who speaks with the inclination toward the
truth... is guilty of no sin, even though he is mistaken in
what he says; and he who speaks with an inclination to
falsehood is guilty of sin even if he describes accurately
what has occurred. "Reum linguam non facit, nisi mens
rea." Therefore, know the motive and you know the
will .... 6
For Augustine, a sinful action was one determined by an
evil will. The will would determine action according to the
soul's loves. A properly ordered soul was selflessly devoted
to God, and derived its other wants from an appreciation of
divine goodness or of the utility of worldly things for divine
purposes. Thus the desire to advance one's own welfare
was good as long as it derived from a sense of one's self as a
useful servant of God. If the pursuit of self-interest derived
from self-love, however, it was evil. Thus an act was sinful
in so far as it resulted from a sinful desire, and a desire
was sinful in so far as it was not regulated by piety. Such a




desire expressed a soul in a state of sinful alienation from
God.7 In short, Augustine's moral thought conceived sin as
a bad desire, expressing a bad character.
Over the second half of the first millennium, the
church, especially in England, developed the doctrine that
sin required properly motivated good works as a penance.'
If the act generating such a debt to God disrupted the
king's peace, it might require that the king also be
appeased. If it resulted in harm, such an act would also
create an obligation to compensate the victim or his family.
But the sinfulness of the act was a wrong to God that
consisted entirely in its evil motive rather than its effects.
Levitt speculated that as the royal courts established
exclusive jurisdiction over many crimes, they were expected
to take over the clerical function of weighing sin and
exacting penance.
It is therefore no surprise that we find in the Leges Henrici
the legal maxim "Reum non facit nisi mens rea." . . . Men
must pay for all the evil they do. ... But the punishment to
be imposed, the penance to be done, depends upon the
presence or absence of mens rea. That is the effect of
Augustine upon the secular law, through the medium of the
penitential books. Nor is it to be wondered at that
increasingly the reported cases present declarations using
the phrases "wickedly and feloniously," "with malice
aforethought," "premeditated assault."9
So on Levitt's view, mens rea was a sweeping requirement
of criminal liability from medieval times, and was rooted in
an Augustinian moral psychology of sinful motive.
Francis Sayre offered a similar account in his classic
1932 article Mens Rea. According to Sayre, canon law
influenced the common law of crimes through Henry De
Bracton's thirteenth century treatise on English law.1"
Bracton proclaimed that crime depended on a will to injure,
7. John M. Rist, Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized 148-91 (1994).
8. Levitt, supra note 6, at 131-32.
9. Levitt, supra note 6, at 135.
10. Francis Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 974, 984-85 (1932).
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and offered this principle to explain the exemption from
liability of infants and the insane.11 Although his treatise
was presented as a summary of existing law, Bracton
conditioned liability for theft on culpable mental states, at
a time when English law did not yet do so. 12 Following
canonist writings on sin, Bracton considered the judge who
ordered the just execution of a felon guilty of homicide, if he
was motivated by malignant intent rather than his duty. '"
On the other hand, while English law still classified
accidental killers as felons, Bracton argued that self-
defenders and accidental killers should be pardoned,
unless, as the canonists held, they had acted unlawfully or
carelessly. 14 In fact, the Crown pardoned homicides rather
freely, and with little regard to culpability. 5 Early in the
next century Parliament petitioned the Crown to restrict
pardons to killings by accident or in self-defense: the crown
agreed, but failed to comply. 6 In 1390, however, the Crown
finally vindicated Bracton by agreeing to refuse pardons to
those who killed with "malice prepense," apparently
meaning those who killed neither accidentally nor in self-
defense.17
According to Sayre, clerical notions of sin influenced
English criminal law over several centuries and eventually
gave rise to an established doctrine that mental culpability
was a prerequisite to criminal liability.
It is, in the last analysis, underlying ethical concepts
which shape and give direction to the growth of the criminal
law. It was almost inevitable, therefore, that the emphasis
placed by Bracton upon the mental element in criminality
should take permanent root and become part of the
11. 2 Henry de Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England 289, 384
(George E. Woodbine ed. & Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968).
12. Id. at 289, 384, 424; Sayre, supra note 10, at 987.
13. Bracton, supra note 11, at 341; Sayre, supra note 10, at 984.
14. Sayre, supra note 10, at 984-86.
15. J.M. Kaye, The Early History of Murder and Manslaughter, 83 L. Q. Rev.
365, 378; Naomi D. Hurnard, The King's Pardon for Homicide Before A.D. 1307,
at vii-xiv (1969).
16. Kaye, supra note 15, at 378.
17. Id. at 390-92.
[Vol. 6:1
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established law. Under the pervasive influence of the
church, the teaching of the penitential books that
punishment should be dependent upon moral guilt gave
powerful impetus to this growth, for the very essence of
moral guilt is a mental element ...
Mens rea, in the period following Bracton, thus
smacked strongly of general moral blameworthiness. The
transition... was all the easier because.., most of the
thirteenth century felonies [robbery, rape, burglary, larceny,
arson and homicide] from their very nature already involved
an intentional element .... The early felonies were roughly
the external manifestations of the heinous sins of the
day....
We can trace the changed attitude in new
generalizations concerning the necessity of an evil intent
which are found scattered through the Year Books in the
remarks of judges and counsel and which later make their
appearance as settled doctrines in the writings of Coke and
Hale during the seventeenth century.18
Gardner relies heavily on Levitt and Sayre in
presenting motive as an outmoded conception of culpability
rooted in a religious morality. Gardner quotes Augustine
as saying "'The evil motive makes the evil act; the good
motive makes the act good,"' 19 although Augustine's term
is usually translated simply as will. Like his predecessors,
Gardner ascribes a requirement of evil motive to Bracton.
Gardner reads Bracton as holding that "not only must an
offender's acts be intended but his ulterior motives or
purposes in acting must also be blameworthy."20 He points
to Bracton's ornate definition of intentional homicide as
killing "'in anger or hatred or for the sake of gain,
deliberately and in premeditated assault.., wickedly and
feloniously and in breach of the King's peace.' 21  He
contrasts this with Bracton's exculpation of killings
necessary for self-defense and committed "'with sorrow of
18. Sayre, supra note 10, at 988-89.
19. Gardner, supra note 5, at 655 (citing Levitt, supra note 6, at 130-31).
20. Id. at 658.
21. Id. at 659.
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the heart.' 22 Gardner also emphasizes Bracton's support of
the canonist doctrine that one is responsible for all
consequences of an unlawful act, so that any unlawful
motive can make one culpable for a resulting harm.23
Like Levitt and Sayre, Gardner asserts that Bracton's
religious conception of culpability pervasively influenced
the development of the criminal law. Gardner quotes
Sayre's conclusion that the early conception of mens rea in
English criminal law was 'little more than a general
immorality of motive.' 24 Like Sayre, Gardner assumes that
this requirement was met in the vast run of cases in which
it was never mentioned: "In cases lacking direct evidence of
malicious intent, its presence was likely assumed from the
actus reus, placing on the accused the burden of showing
absence of blame."" Gardner insists that "the early law
saw malicious motivation as an essential component of
moral blameworthiness, whether or not [it] carried mens
rea to its logical conclusion.
'26
On the other hand, Jerome Hall was rightly skeptical
of Sayre's historical thesis.27 To be sure, Bracton was
influenced by canon law and the Augustinian conception of
sin. But as Maitland pointed out, Bracton was not a very
reliable reporter of the English law of his day. Sayre
admits as much.29 As to the incorporation of Bracton's
views in medieval and early modern criminal law, the
evidence seems thin. It consists of the quoted phrase in the
Leges Henrici, a couple of references to felonious intent in
fifteenth century cases, and the predication of murder
liability on the elusive criterion of "malice prepense" in the
22. Id. at 660.
23. Id. at 656.
24. Id. at 663 (quoting Francis Sayre, The Present Signification of Mens Rea
in the Criminal Law, in Harvard Legal Essays 399, 411-12 (1934)).
25. Id. at 665.
26. Id. at 667.
27. Hall, supra note 1, at 143-47.
28. 1 Frederic William Maitland, The Collected Papers of Frederic William
Maitland 314 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1911).
29. Sayre, supra note 10, at 985-87.
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sixteenth century.30 But we cannot simply assume canon
law's influence on criminal law. Canon law and criminal
law had very different functions: canon law provided the
framework for a pervasive regulation of the lives of clerics.
By contrast, the criminal law was an inherently limited
legal system, ignoring all wrongs and disputes unless they
erupted into violent breaches of the king's peace.3' The
violent and public character of criminal wrongdoing
militated against any very great concern with the
wrongdoer's mental state.2 The question of culpability
arose only when the wrongdoer offered an excuse. We
cannot infer that courts always conceived crime as sin, but
were always satisfied that criminals had the requisite evil
motives. They may simply have seen the sinfulness and
the criminality of conduct as two separate questions, to be
answered by two different institutions.
Sayre and Gardner infer that evil motive was a
"settled" requirement of criminal liability throughout the
High Middle Ages and Renaissance because, at the end of
this period Coke used the term "mens rea." Sayre quotes a
passage in which Coke reasons that theft must involve an
intent to steal at the time of the acquiring the goods,
because of the principle "actus non facit reum nisi mens sit
rea."33 But Sayre argues that by Coke's day, the exigencies
of deciding cases had refined the concept of mens rea from
some "vague" notion of blameworthiness or sin in general,
to the particular mental elements of different crimes and
defenses. 4 Sayre comments:
Coke shows that by the seventeenth century the term mens
rea had already undergone a revolutionary change in
meaning since the time of its adoption from the penitential
books. It is used, not with its old connotation of moral guilt,
30. Id. at 983, 991-92.
31. Hurnard, supra note 15, at 8.
32. Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Criminal Law 702-03 (2d ed.
1986); George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 76-90 (1978).
33. Sir Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England
107 (William S. Hein Co. 1986) (reprint of 1797 ed.); Sayre, supra note 10, at 999.
34. Sayre, supra note 10, at 994.
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but with reference to a precise intent at a given time.
Evidently the term was being employed in a general way
during the seventeenth century to denote the mental
requirement for any given crime, and this of course differed
vastly in respect to different offenses.35
According to Sayre, different offenses required different
mental elements, because they protected different societal
interests. 6 The function of criminal law had shifted from
identifying sin to identifying persons willing to endanger
those interests. Accordingly, mens rea had shifted from an
inquiry into the moral worth of defendant's motives, to an
inquiry into defendant's expectations regarding danger to
protected interests.
Gardner agrees with Sayre that a "centuries-long"
process of adjudication recast "the original normative
notion of mens rea ... in terms descriptive of the specific
forms of intent required for each particular offense." 37 Like
Sayre, Gardner identifies Coke as a leader in this
movement, and points to his enumeration of a diverse
collection of circumstances that would "imply" the malice
required for murder, without regard to the killer's feelings
toward the victim. Thus, both Sayre and Gardner assume
that mens rea was an accepted requirement of criminal
liability throughout the medieval and early modern
periods, while treating the fact that Coke's use of the term
did not fit the evil motive model as evidence that the
content of the requirement had changed. Even Hall treats
Coke's use of the term as evidence that it had become
common among lawyers over time. Yet scholars apparently
have not discovered other references to mens rea between
the Leges Henrici and Coke. Moreover, Coke is notorious
for ascribing his own views to the past, with little
supporting evidence. 8
35. Id. at 999-1000.
36. Id. at 994, 1017.
37. Gardner, supra note 5, at 667-68.
38. See, e.g., James F. Stephen, 3 History of English Criminal Law 57-58
(1883) (criticizing Coke's unlawful act murder rule as unsupported by cases cited).
[Vol. 6:1
MOTIVE AND INTENT
Perhaps a more accurate account would be that
centuries of judicial and statutory development of the
criminal law proliferated diverse culpability requirements
without there having ever been a general requirement of, or
a unified conception of, culpability.
If so, then the "motive to intent" thesis ascribes a false
coherence to the supposedly traditional conception of mens
rea as motive, and thereby lends to the "modern" view of
culpability as intent a similarly false coherence. In short, I
suspect that the supposedly ancient conception of mens rea
as evil motive is really a modern polemical construct.
II. THE PROBLEM OF OFFENSE DEFINITION AND THE
TERMINOLOGY OF INTENTION
The common law still lacked any coherent conception
of mens rea when summarized by Blackstone in the late
eighteenth century. To be sure, Blackstone held that crime
depended on "first, a vitious will; and, secondly, an
unlawful act consequent upon such vitious will." 9 Yet he
did not mean by this that culpability was a distinct element
of criminal liability to be proven by the prosecution in every
case. Instead, culpability was ordinarily presumed from
the performance of some "unlawful" act. Culpability could
only be placed in issue by the defense, in attempting to
prove some defense of excuse. "All the several pleas and
excuses, which protect the committer of a forbidden act
from the punishment which is otherwise annexed thereto,
may be reduced to this single consideration, the want or
defect of will ... the concurrence of the will ... being the
only thing that renders human actions praiseworthy or
culpable." Such excuses included infancy, insanity, duress,
and necessity, as well as accident and mistake.4"
Significantly, Blackstone discusses these excuses in a
chapter on the sorts of persons capable of committing a
crime. To act on the basis of mistake or to cause an
39. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 21 (Univ. of
Chicago Press 1979) (1769).
40. Id. at 20-22.
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accident was to act without capacity or competence. It was
to be, at least temporarily, deficient in legal personality.
Culpability or volition, then, was a characteristic of the
actor rather than of the criminal act, and was ordinarily
presumed. This may fit a notion of mens rea as general
moral blameworthiness, but does not have much to do with
any more precise idea of mens rea as evil motive.
When we turn to the particular offenses described by
Blackstone, we find that about half of the most serious
crimes were not defined by reference to any culpability.
Felonies apparently requiring no culpability included
rape,4' robbery,4  piracy, poaching in disguise,
44
destroying tollhouses and the like,45 exporting wool,
46
fraudulent bankruptcy,47  plague victims violating
quarantine,4 8 bigamy,49 soldiers wandering without leave,5
jailers coercing prisoners to testify,5 obstructing justice,
escape, convicts or Catholic recusants returning from
exile,54 demanding a reward for the return of property,55
serving a foreign prince,56 desertion,57 and harboring a
Catholic priest.58  Certain forms of treason also were
defined without reference to culpability. These included
Catholic priests failing to take an oath of conformation, 9
41. Id. at 210.
42. Id. at 241.
43. Id. at 71-72.
44. Id. at 144.
45. Id. at 144.
46. Id. at 154.
47. Id. at 156. This appears to have consisted in certain inherently deceptive
practices, rather than fraudulent intent.
48. Id. at 162.
49. Id. at 164.
50. Id. at 165.
51. Id. at 129.
52. Id. at 129.
53. Id. at 130.
54. Id. at 131.
55. Id. at 132.
56. Id. at 100.
57. Id. at 101.
58. Id. at 56.
59. Id. at 56.
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carnal knowledge of the queen or crown princess,60
counterfeiting the king's seal,61 and killing a judge.62
Where serious crimes did require culpability, that
culpability was defined in a wide variety of ways. Only two
felonies were defined in terms of knowledge: paying with
counterfeit coin63  and sending extortionate letters.64
Liability as an accessory-after-the-fact required knowledge
that the person harbored was a felon.65 Crimes were more
commonly defined by reference to a wide variety of specific
purposes. Such crimes included riot with intent to change
the laws or do violence to the privy council, 66 smuggling in
defiance of the law, or in disguise to evade capture,67
negligently or connivingly permitting escape,6" conspiring
or confederating to kill a lord,69 attempting to kill an
officer,70 embezzling the king's arms for gain or to impede
his army,71 and mayhem with intent to maim or disfigure.
Three forms of treason involved special culpability terms.
Compassing the death of the king was an inchoate offense
which, Blackstone opined, required "purpose or design.
7 3
Making war on the king and adhering to the king's enemies
required inquiry into purposes or expected effects of the
defendant's actions.
In addition, three more general culpability terms were
used: willfulness, malice, and felonious intent. Blackstone
lists the offenses of willfully falsifying court records,75 and
60. Id. at 81.
61. Id. at 83.
62. Id. at 83-84.
63. Id. at 99.
64. Id. at 144.
65. Id. at 37.
66. Id. at 142.
67. Id. at 155.
68. Id. at 130.
69. Id. at 100.
70. Id. at 100.
71. Id. at 101.
72. Id. at 207.
73. Id. at 78-79.
74. Id. at 82.
75. Id. at 128.
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willfully or maliciously shooting.16 Blackstone did associate
the term malice with an open-ended inquiry into the moral
quality of defendant's motivation. Thus he conditioned the
offense of malicious mischief, on" a spirit of wanton cruelty
or black diabolical revenge."77 Blackstone followed earlier
writers in defining murder as unlawful killing with malice
aforethought:" "This is the grand criterion which now
distinguishes murder from other killing: and this.., is not
so properly spite or malevolence to the deceased in
particular, as any evil design in general; the dictate of a
wicked, depraved, and malignant heart." 9  This last
colorful phrase was drawn from Blackstone's contemporary,
Sir Michael Foster.80  It reflected not some ancient
Augustinian notion of sin, but trendy eighteenth century
ideas about the basis of morality in human sympathy.
While Blackstone defined malice aforethought in these
broad terms, he went on to detail its specific forms. First,
he divided malice into express and implied malice. Express
malice "is when one, with a sedate deliberate mind and
formed design, doth kill another: which formed design is
evidenced by external circumstances discovering that
inward intention; as by lying in wait, antecedent menaces,
former grudges, and concerted schemes to do him some
bodily harm. "s8 Blackstone added that express malice
included the "evil design" to "beat another in a cruel and
unusual manner," though without an intent to kill; or to
place a group of people in danger of death; or to kill an
unknown victim; or to commit an unlawful act "of which
the probable consequence might be bloodshed."8 2 The law
"implied" malice in a hodgepodge of circumstances, not
readily distinguishable from those which "discovered"
express malice. These included killings by poison, or
76. Id. at 208.
77. Id. at 243.
78. Id. at 198.
79. Id. at 198-99.
80. Sir Michael. Foster, Report and Discourses on the Crown Law 256-57 (2d
ed. 1776).
81. 4 Blackstone, supra note 39, at 200.
82. Id.
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without provocation, or of officer on duty, or accidentally in
the attempt to commit a felony. Reiterating his earlier
view that culpability consisted simply in unimpaired
volition rather than some additional quality of depravity,
Blackstone concluded that
all homicide is malicious ... unless where justified by the
command or permission of the law; excused on a principle of
accident or self-preservation; or alleviated into
manslaughter, by being either the involuntary consequence
of some act, not strictly lawful, or (if voluntary) occasioned
by some sudden and violent provocation. And all these
circumstances of justification, excuse, or alleviation, it is
incumbent on the prisoner to make out ..
Blackstone defined the offenses of larceny and
burglary by reference to "felonious intent." Yet this phrase
meant quite different things in these two contexts. The
"felonious intent" in larceny consisted in a quality of
dishonesty or furtiveness accompanying a taking: "The
ordinary discovery of felonious intent is where the party
doth it clandestinely; or being charged with the fact, denies
it."85 While Blackstone noted that the return of the goods
negated felonious intent, he did not define that intent as
the intent to permanently deprive. 86 Nor did he explain the
relevance of furtiveness as manifesting awareness that the
goods taken belonged to another. Instead, he concluded
that the criteria of felonious intent could not be
enumerated and must be left to the discretion of fact-
finders.87 By contrast, the felonious intent required for
burglary was simply the unmysterious intent to commit
some felony after breaking and entering.
88
So a snapshot of English criminal law in the late
eighteenth century reveals a great diversity of mental
83. Id. at 200-201.
84. Id. at 201.
85. Id. at 232.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 227.
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criteria that might be required in inculpating or
exculpating defendants, and a good many crimes requiring
no culpability at all. If mens rea was an essential
requirement of criminal liability, it was not an offense
element to be proven by the prosecution, or a requirement
of evil motive. It was a presumed capacity for moral
agency to be disproved by the defense. Of course after the
fact, we can string together all the disparate forms of
culpability, join them to excuses based on incapacity, and
claim they stand for one coherent principle. We can treat
crimes without culpability requirements as involving acts
that offend that principle inherently and so obviate any
further proof of culpability. But in doing so we project the
concerns of modern criminal law theory onto the past.
While we will not find the modern idea of intent as an
essential offense element in Blackstone, we will see some of
the assumptions that may have made such an idea
attractive. Recall that Sayre associates the idea that each
crime has its own mental element with a new conception of
criminal law as serving to protect diverse social interests.
Blackstone articulated this new conception in his
Commentaries, where he explained that criminal law was
distinguished from civil law by its unique function of
protecting the public interest. 9 He divided his discussion
into the different interests protected, and began each
chapter with an explanation as to how the interest
discussed concerns the public.
The conception of crime Blackstone's new theory
replaced was not some moral notion of crime as sin. Crime
had long been seen as a threat to the king's peace.90
Blackstone's theory of crime as harm to diverse interests
simply expanded the public interests protected by the
criminal law, beyond the king's peace. Blackstone had to
take account of the great proliferation of criminal
legislation during the eighteenth century, especially in the
89. Id. at 5.
90. 1 Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, The History of English
Law Before the Time of Edward I 45 (Cambridge, The Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1898);
Hurnard, supra note 15, at 8.
[Vol. 6:1
MOTIVE AND INTENT
area of property crimes.91 He also had to contend with a
new, more democratic and inclusive conception of political
legitimacy, articulated by Locke and brought to bear in the
Glorious Revolution.92 It was now the function of the state
to protect the natural and civil rights of its citizens, not
simply to maintain a monopoly on violence.
This more democratic conception of the state entailed
an expanded function for the criminal law. But because the
process of criminal lawmaking was still not entirely
democratic, this expanded conception of the criminal law
posed a new problem of legitimacy. This problem of
legitimacy perhaps accounts for the tremendous interest in
criminal law reform in late eighteenth century England.
The criminal law was increasingly draconian, but still
seemed like an arcane, and highly discretionary, creation of
judges. And as the scope and function of the criminal law
expanded, so did the power of judges. After all, the power of
Parliament to legislate was traditionally understood as a
power constrained by the common law's principles and
purposes.94 According to Blackstone, "statutes are either
declaratory of the common law, or remedial of some defects
therein."95 On this theory, Parliament can identify a wide
array of new public interests and criminalize threats to
those interests, only if the common law already recognizes
and protects these interests, at least implicitly. And if
Parliament can declare the common law of crimes, so can
courts, a fortiori. In this way, the newly democratic theory
of the criminal law that was needed to account for new
criminal legislation, also expanded the traditionally
recognized power of judges to define new common law
crimes. Courts could now criminalize any act that seemed
to injure or endanger some public interest. Blackstone
91. See generally, Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in
Douglas Hay et al., Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century
England 17-63 (1975); Jerome Hall, Theft, Law and Society 3-36 (1935).
92. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 120-24
(1765).
93. Hay, supra note 91.
94. Binder and Weisberg, supra note 4, at 36-37 (2000).
95. 1 Blackstone, supra note 92, at 86.
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devoted a chapter to offenses against the public police and
economy, which included such vague categories as
vagrancy 96 and public nuisance: "the doing of a thing to the
annoyance of all the king's subjects, or the neglecting to do
a thing which the common good requires."97
When the concept of crime was associated with a
breach of the king's peace, it may have seemed unnecessary
to define the elements of offenses with any great precision.
Conduct would attract the attention of the criminal law
only if it culminated in bloodshed. Thus the criminal law
had formerly been concerned with the relatively narrow
problem of assigning responsibility for violent conflict.
With the concept of a crime no longer anchored by a
requirement of violence, however, the criminal law was
increasingly rife with uncertainty, and there was a more
manifest need to define offenses prospectively. One
possible way to cabin the expansion of criminal liability
was to condition liability on culpability in a more
systematic way. Yet it was difficult to define culpable
mental states with any precision unless one tied them to
some specific act or harmful result. Thus the expanded
conception of crime as harm to any public interest, which
Blackstone announced, posed problems of doctrinal
determinacy and institutional legitimacy; and one
appealing solution was to carefully define act and mental
elements of offenses.
The problem was possibly more acute in the newly
independent United States, where democratic norms were
more firmly established, and where the continuing
authority of the British common law was open to question.
American reformers criticized British criminal law as
excessively harsh and supported legislation reducing the
number of capital crimes.98  American courts could
reasonably assume that the British common law would
remain in force until superseded by American legislation.
96. 4 Blackstone, supra note 39, at 169.
97. Id. at 167.
98. See Edwin R. Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating
Degrees of Murder, 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 759, 766-773 (1949).
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But could they maintain the traditional assumption that
legislation served only to fill gaps in the common law?
Could they assume that an expansion of legislative
jurisdiction expanded the scope of their own lawmaking
powers as well? The requirements of developing the
infrastructure for a commercial economy and an urban
society occasioned much local legislation during the early
republican period, 99  including criminal legislation.10
Courts also used their common law powers to foster their
own vision of development, 101 and these powers included
defining common law crimes against the public welfare and
police.102  But this ad hoc approach to criminalization
rendered the definition of criminal conduct frighteningly
indeterminate.
The Pennsylvania case of Respublica v. Caldwell °3
illustrates the problem. Caldwell was charged with public
nuisance for erecting a wharf on public property. He
argued that his wharf was not an annoyance to the public,
because it was in fact, and by design, beneficial to the
public. The court, however, refused to hear his evidence,
reasoning that, regardless of the consequences, and of his
intentions, Caldwell had infringed a common right. But
99. See generally, William J. Novak, The People's Welfare: Law and
Regulation in Nineteenth Century America (1996); Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837) (state and local police power to regulate health, safety
and morals); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851) (legislative
police power to regulate property).
100. Novak, supra note 99, at 15-16, 153-55; Nathaniel Chipman, Principles of
Government: A Treatise on Free Institutions, Including the Constitution of the
United States 209-17 (1833).
101. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860
(1977).
102. Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Criminal Law 632-74 (Little,
Brown & Co., 5th ed. 1872) (doctrine of public nuisance offenses); Respublica v.
Teischer, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 335 (Pa. 1788) (any public wrong is indictable);
Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91 (Pa. 1815) (any act "tending to
corrupt" public morals indictable); Commonwealth v. Wing, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 1
(1829) (any deliberate act of mischief indictable); State v. Buckman, 8 N.H. 203
(1836) (any act providing an evil example against good morals indictable);
Commonwealth v. McHale, 97 Pa. 397 (1881) (category of "police offenses"
comprises all crimes "affecting public society").
103. 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 150 (Pa. Ct. of Oyer & Terminer 1785).
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how could Caldwell have anticipated what conduct would
be deemed a public nuisance? What is the actus reus
element of Caldwell's offense? Trespassing on public
property? Infringing a common right? Harming the
public? Finally, unless the proscribed act is defined, how
can we determine the mental element, if any, of this
offense? If the offense consists in harming the public, why
should not the mental element be, as Caldwell suggested,
the intent to harm the public? The less precise the conduct
constituting a particular crime, the more appealing it is to
condition liability on some very general criterion of
culpability like "evil motive." Conversely, the more precise
the conduct proscribed, the less necessary is a moral
assessment of the actor's state of mind. The Caldwell case
would later be cited for the proposition that good motive
was no defense, but it also illustrates how difficult it is to
determine criminal responsibility for an offense with no
defined conduct element. The Caldwell case illustrates
why a broader conception of the interests protected by the
criminal law necessitated more precise definition of
offenses, including their mental elements; and it shows the
need to separate the legislative function of offense
definition from the judicial function of evaluating
particular conduct.
The maxim that the criminal law is concerned with
intent, but not motive, arose as a result of two responses to
this problem of offense definition. One response was the
effort of jurists to develop a scientific-that is, a systematic
and complete-analysis of offenses into elements. The
other, discussed in the next section, was the utilitarian
project of legislative codification.
The effort to develop a systematic analysis of offenses
into mental and physical elements can be traced back to
the early eighteenth century jurist William Hawkins.
Hawkins offered an account of felony murder liability as
the transfer of intent from one felony to another.'
104. The felony murder rule was first proposed by dictum in the case of Rex v.
Plummer, Kelyng 109, 84 Eng. Rep. 1103 (1701), and endorsed by several
subsequent jurists, including Foster, Blackstone and East, but does not appear to
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Hawkins proposed "a general rule, that where ever a man
intending to commit one felony, happens to commit
another, he is as much guilty as if he had intended the
felony he actually commits. ' 10 5  Hawkins's "general
principal" implicitly divided felonies into an act and an
intent, and made the intentions to commit different felonies
interchangeable. Hawkins did not clarify whether he
thought felony liability always required intent.
Hawkins's analytic scheme was refined by Justice Sir
Peter King, who declined to apply his "general principle" in
the 1722 case of Rex v. Woodbourne and Coke.
106
Woodbourne and Coke were charged under a mayhem
statute punishing the felony of maiming with intent to
disfigure. They claimed they had lacked the requisite
intent to disfigure but instead had intended to kill (which
would have made their attack the mere misdemeanor of
attempted murder). King agreed that the offense required
an actual intent to disfigure (which he encouraged the jury
to find present), reasoning that Hawkins's principle of
transferred felonious intent applied only to certain crimes:
There are some cases where an unlawful or felonious
intent to do one act, may be carried over to another act,
done in prosecution thereof; and such other act will be
felony, because done in prosecution of an unlawful intent.
As, if a man shoots at a wild fowl, wherein no man hath any
property, and by such shooting happens unawares to kill a
man; this homicide is not felony, but only a misadventure or
chance-medley, because it was an accident that happened in
the doing of a lawful act: but if this man had shot at a tame
fowl, wherein another had property, but not with intention
to steal it, and by such shooting had accidentally killed a
man, he would then have been guilty of manslaughter,
because done in prosecution of an unlawful action, viz.
have been actually applied in England or America before the nineteenth century.
See Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules (2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The Buffalo Criminal Law Review).
105. William Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, 1716-1721, at 74 (Professional
Books 1973).
106. 16 St. Tr. 53 (1722).
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committing a trespass on another's property: But if he had
had an intention of stealing this tame fowl, then such an
accidental killing of a man would have been murder,
because done in prosecution of a felonious intent, viz. an
intent to steal....
But now the indictment on this statute is for a certain
particular intent; for purposely, maliciously, and by lying in
wait, slitting Mr. Crispe's nose, with an intention in so
doing to maim or disfigure.' °7
Here we have the idea, although not yet the
terminology, of specific and general intent crimes: there are
some offenses that require a "particular" intent, and others
requiring merely an "unlawful" intent. King made no
suggestion that all offenses require intent, whether general
or specific.
In 1770, however, Lord Mansfield did make such a
suggestion, in the criminal libel case of Rex v. Woodfall.
08
Mansfield concluded that criminal libel did not require any
intent to injure a victim's reputation, but only the
publication of a document, injurious in fact. This, however,
was a form of the criminal intent requisite to all criminal
liability. Mansfield reasoned: "When an act, in itself
indifferent, becomes criminal if done with a particular
intent, then the intent must be proved and found; but when
the act is in itself unlawful, the proof of justification and
excuse lies on the defendant, and in failure thereof, the law
implies a criminal intent."0 s With this notion of "implied
criminal intent," Mansfield reinterpreted all offenses as
offenses of intent, while requiring proof of that intent only
for inchoate offenses, involving some intended but
unconsummated harm. Mansfield accomplished what
Blackstone had not, which was to locate Blackstone's
"vitious will" within the definition of each offense.
107. Id. at 79.
108. 5 Burrows 2667 (1770).
109. Id. (emphasis added). For an American case along these lines, see
Commonwealth v. Hersey, 84 Mass. 173, 2 Allen 173 (1861) (inchoate crimes
require proof of specific intent; intent implied in result offenses).
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Mansfield's distinction between inherently unlawful
acts and innocent acts rendered criminal by a particular
intent, combined with Hawkins's idea of transferrable
unlawful intent, gave rise to the nineteenth century
distinction between general intent and specific intent
offenses. The American commentator Joel Prentiss Bishop
popularized this terminology, which he used to explain
when an offender was responsible for the unintended
consequences of an act. Bishop offered the theory that
crimes ordinarily required both an intention to "do a
forbidden thing" and a harmful result. Yet the harm
produced need not be the specific harm intended: a "general
intent" to commit some crime ordinarily sufficed to make
the offender criminally responsible for any harm caused.
As long as the intended result was roughly as bad as the
result produced, the unlawful intent would "transfer" to the
actual, but unintended, result. Yet Bishop excepted certain
crimes from this doctrine of a transferable or "general"
intent to do wrong. These crimes required a "specific
intent" that could only transfer to a result of the same kind
intended.110 By the mid-nineteenth century, then, lawyers
were familiar with the proposition that every offense
involved a mental element, which they commonly referred
to as some form of "intent." This category of intent seemed
to include desiderative states like purposes or motives, as
well as cognitive states like expectations.
III. THE DISUTILITY OF PUNISHING MOTIVES
The idea that the intent element of offenses should not
include motive emerged out of the utilitarian tradition.
Utilitarian penology may be seen as a response to the
problem of offense definition posed by Blackstone's account
of the common law of crimes. Blackstone's theory of crimes
as acts identified by the common law as harming or
endangering public interests is partly compatible with
110. 1 Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Criminal Law 220-22, 229
(1856-58).
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utilitarianism. Utilitarians could agree that the function of
the criminal law was to protect the public welfare against
harm and danger, but they could not agree that common
law adjudication was the proper method to identify the
public interest. Utilitarianism's democratic premises
required that a representative legislature define the public
interest through legislation.11' The utilitarian concern with
effective and optimal deterrence required that proscribed
conduct be defined precisely, prospectively, and publicly.
1 2
Even though Blackstone's new, expanded theory of the
criminal law had been necessitated by legislative activism,
Blackstone still presented the criminal law as essentially a
body of judicially developed principle. Thus Blackstone's
theory of the criminal law was passably utilitarian at the
level of substance, but not at the level of procedure.
Blackstone's ambitious but unsuccessful effort to
reconcile the traditional common law with enlightenment
political theory1 3 provoked Bentham's polemical attack on
the common law,1 and his effort to reconstruct British law
on wholly utilitarian and democratic premises."5 One of
Bentham's main goals was to develop a lucid, value-free
language for policy analysis, legal analysis, and legislative
drafting. This would enable the public to monitor their
legislative representatives to ensure that legislation served
the public interest. It would enable legislators to
communicate clear conduct norms and sanctions to the
public. And it would enable the public to monitor judicial
and executive application of legislation to ensure
compliance with legislative will. In trying to develop a
111. See Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and
Punishment of the Innocent, 32 Rutgers L.J. 115, 189-200 (2000); Guyora Binder,
Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?, 5 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 321, 333-349
(2002).
112. Binder & Smith, supra note 111, at 184-89, 200-10; Binder, supra note
111, at 333-349.
113. See Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28
Buff. L. Rev. 205, 258-272 (1979).
114. Jeremy Bentham: A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on
Government (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Humanities Press 1977) (1776).
115. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1789).
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clear, descriptive language for legislation and legal
analysis, Bentham distinguished motive from intent.
Bentham thought that law could exploit motives and
desires to regulate behavior, but that motives themselves
were products of human nature, beyond the power of law to
regulate. Thus, the irrelevance of motive claim is an
outgrowth of the great eighteenth century project of
redeeming the passions that gave rise to economics as well
as utilitarian penology.116 The general idea that tough-
minded public policy should eschew the moral evaluation of
desires is already visible in Mandeville's Fable of the Bees,
which argues that "private vices" often yield public
benefits.117  Hobbes sounded a similar note in his
demonstration that law and the state could be explained as
the rationally self-interested creations of egoists. The point
was argued more systematically by the Swiss utilitarian,
Baron Helvetius. Helvetius' fundamental idea was that the
principles of human psychology should be regarded
scientifically, rather than morally. The passions driving
human action should be seen as healthy and beneficial or,
at worst, as morally neutral. According to Helvetius, the
same basic human passions-the desire for pleasure and
satisfaction, and the fear of pain and want-were the
motive force behind both good and bad actions. Actions
were good or bad according to their effects on human
happiness, rather than their motivating passions.
Differing environmental circumstances might channel the
same passions into beneficial or harmful actions. The role
of moral philosophy was not to condemn the passions, but
to accept them as inevitable and to figure out how to use
them in enhancing human happiness. Thus, the real task
of the moral philosopher was to apply psychology to the
problem of designing efficacious laws. The purpose of law,
in turn, was to shape the circumstances and incentives
facing actors, so as to channel their passions towards
116. Albert 0. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments
for Capitalism Before Its Triumph (1977).
117. Bernard Mandeveille, Fable of the Bees: Or Private Vices, Publick
Benefits (1924).
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beneficial actions. In so doing, law would define, denounce,
and punish harmful behavior, rather than dissolute
passions.118
Bentham embraced Helvetius' principles and took up
the task of designing utilitarian legislation. In designing
criminal legislation, Bentham reasoned that the passions
motivating human behavior were an inevitable fixture of
human psychology, and so could not be used to distinguish
criminal from innocent behavior. Yet, Bentham realized,
this did not mean that mental criteria of liability were
useless. While the purpose of criminal law was to deter
harmful behavior, this could only be done by punishing
behavior that actors expected to cause harm. Since
deterrence operated on the basis of actors' expectations, it
could only work in so far as actors knew they were or might
be engaging in punishable conduct. And to the extent that
the threat of punishment could not deter, actual
punishment was pointless cruelty. Thus there was a
utilitarian rationale for conditioning liability on either the
expectation of harmful results, or knowledge of
circumstances that rendered action harmful. It was not
necessary that the actor personally recognize that the
forbidden consequences or results were harmful, so long as
the actor had notice that they were forbidden and
punishable.
While optimally deterring harm required conditioning
punishment on the expectation of proscribed results or
circumstances, optimal deterrence did not require that
punishment be conditioned on actual harm. The behavior
to be deterred was behavior likely to cause harm. Limiting
punishment to actual harm would create a punishment
lottery, reducing the certainty of punishment for dangerous
behavior. To compensate for this reduction in certainty,
legislators would have to increase the severity of
punishment for those actually causing harm. Decision
makers and officials might well and rightly balk at
118. Claude Helvetius, De L'Esprit, Or Essays on the Mind and its Several
Faculties 7, 10, 29, 39, 124-125 (new ed., B. Franklin 1970) (1759).
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imposing such severe punishments on those who were
morally no worse than others whose dangerous acts had
not happened to result in harm. Discretionary and
haphazard imposition of draconian punishments would
further reduce the certainty of the law's deterrent threat,
requiring still greater and still more counterproductive
increases in the severity of punishment. All of this meant
that laws designed to prevent harm should punish the
expectation of harm rather than harm itself. Utilitarian
penology therefore favored inchoate over complete offenses.
Bentham's deterrence theory accordingly conceived
criminal liability as essentially a matter of expectations
accompanying action. It identified motives as the forces
that deterrent sanctions were designed to mobilize in
controlling behavior; but because these motives were both
indestructible and useful, they could not be punished. "By
a motive.., is to be understood any thing whatsoever,
which by influencing the will of a sensitive being, is
supposed to serve as a means of determining him to act, or
voluntarily to forebear to act, upon any occasion."119 For
Bentham, a motive is a desire or fear that causes action,
while an intention is an expectation accompanying action.
Motives are desiderative and intentions are cognitive.
Bentham objected to the language of motives as
saturated with normative judgment. Motives are always
described in eulogistic or dyslogistic terms. But these
terms are also misleading. No motive, Bentham argued, is
bad in itself, because all motives are ultimately the same:
the desire for pleasure and the fear of pain. And most of
the sources of pleasure-physical appetites, curiosity,
empathy, and the desire for esteem-are benign, if pursued
in harmless ways. Bentham argued that even hatred can be
benign in its effects, as when it induces one who is wronged
by disutilitarian behavior to testify against a wrongdoer.
Thus what makes an action bad or good is its hedonic
effects, not its motives. Indeed, the purpose of the threat of
criminal punishment is to harness each individual's selfish
119. Bentham, supra note 115, at 97.
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motives to the public good, and so to render it efficacious.
Without self-regard, criminal punishment would have no
beneficial effect and would simply impose needless
suffering.
So Bentham's distinction between motive and intent
combines three ideas: (1) The criminal law should reduce
discretion by precisely defining offenses. (2) It should
define offenses in neutral descriptive language rather than
normative language. And (3) it should define culpability
by reference to cognitive states like expectations, rather
than desiderative states like purposes. Conduct should be
criminalized on the basis of its effects, or better, its likely
effects, rather than on the basis of bad character,
manifested by an immoral attitude. From the standpoint of
the legislator, there is no such thing as an immoral
attitude, only dangerous actions to be discouraged by
punitive sanctions.
In his Lectures on Jurisprudence, John Austin further
refined Bentham's distinction between motive and intent.
Austin distinguished four concepts: act, volition, intention,
and motive. Austin defined acts as bodily movements only,
as distinguished from any of their consequences. He
defined volition as a desiderative state accompanying acts.
He defined intentions as cognitive states, involving
awareness of willed acts and their consequences. In
Austin's language, motives are desiderative states which
cause or "determine" action,120 but do not include
volitions. 1 1 Thus motives are always desiderative attitudes
towards the consequences of actions. A motivating desire is
always a desire for a feeling of pleasure or gratification or
relief from suffering or fear. Thus an actor might be
motivated by nothing more than the desire to experience
joy in physical movement. That joy is still a consequence of
the act rather than the act itself, so that the motivating
desire to enjoy the act is distinct from the will to act.
120. 1 John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence 422 (Robert Campbell ed., 3d
ed., J. Murray 1869) (1863).
121. Id. at 432.
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A motive, then, is a wish causing or preceding a volition:-a
wish for something not to be attained by wishing it, but
which the party believes he will probably or certainly attain,
by means of those wishes which are styled acts of the will.
... [M]otives may precede motives as well as acts of the
will. For the desired object which is said to determine the
will may itself be desired as a mean to an ulterior purpose.
In which case, the desire of the object, which is the ultimate
end, prompts the desire which immediately precedes the
volition.122
An expected (and so intended) consequence can also be
a desired consequence. Thus, "[wihere an intended
consequence is wished as an end or a mean, motive and
intention concur."123 Nevertheless, even when intention
and motivation coincide, it is the intention that inculpates,
rather than the motivation. The desire for pleasure is a
constant, and is not punishable. It is the knowledge that
gratifying that desire will have the collateral consequence
of imposing a proscribed harm or risk that subjects the
actor to punishment.
Austin is responsible for developing much of the
modern conceptual vocabulary of culpability, later used in
the Model Penal Code. Austin pioneered the idea of tying
every culpable mental state to some state of affairs in the
world. For Austin, acts are unlawful not in themselves, but
only by virtue of their consequences. It is only these
consequences that can be culpably intended or desired. If
intent governs only consequences, not acts, there can be no
"general intent." A criminal intent must be specific: it
must be knowledge of some probability of the consequences
of action that would render an otherwise innocent action
unlawful. Austin therefore distinguished a number of
different levels of awareness: negligence (which he called
"heedlessness"), recklessness ("rashness"), and intent.
Austin also permitted purpose or "design" as a criterion of
122. Id. at 428.
123. Id. at 436.
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liability in so far as it implied the expectation of harm,"'
while nevertheless insisting that motive is irrelevant.
"Malice as signifying criminal design ... is often
confounded with malice as denoting malevolence; insomuch
that malevolence (though the motive or inducement of the
party is foreign to the question of his guilt or innocence) is
supposed to be essential to the crime. 125
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF THE IRRELEVANCE OF MOTIVE
In the second half of the nineteenth century, courts
began to contrast motive and intent explicitly. Gardner
recounts this process:
As the definition of the criminal law increasingly became
more a legislative rather than a judicial matter, legislatures
identified the mens rea of various crimes, minimizing the
earlier retributive interests of the criminal law in the
pursuit of a utilitarian agenda of crime control. With the
emergence of legal positivism, the interest in protecting the
general welfare from the harmful effects of an emerging
industrialized society led to the mid-nineteenth century
enactment of a variety of strict liability laws .... Often
legislatures enacted statutes without specifying any mens
rea .... [or] listing myriad, often undefined, mens rea
terms as part of the offense ... relying on the courts to sort
matters out .... As courts attempted to clarify the mens rea
elements of various offenses, they often specifically rejected
the original evil motive approach in favor of describing
particular states of mind as essential for criminal
liability.
2 6
Gardner's key examples are two well-known English
malicious damage cases from the 1870's.127 Pembliton was
convicted of malicious damage after heaving a stone at
another person, which broke a window. In overturning his
124. 2 Austin at 1093.
125. Id.
126. Gardner, supra note 5, at 671-73 (footnotes omitted).
127. Id. at 673-77.
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conviction, the Court of Crown Cases Reserved concluded
that while Pembliton's motive in throwing the stone may
have been malicious, Pembliton did not maliciously damage
property because he did not intentionally or recklessly (or
perhaps even negligently) damage it." 8 In attempting to
steal rum from a ship's hold, Faulkner accidentally set the
ship on fire. His conviction for malicious damage was
overturned on similar grounds: his felonious motive for the
act causing the fire did not amount to maliciously
damaging property. That would require doing so
intentionally, or at least negligently in the course of an
unlawful act.'29 For Gardner, these cases represent the
repudiation of the rule imposing responsibility for all
consequences of an illegal act, and the larger principle that
any evil motive whatsoever can supply the mental element
of any crime. These cases stand for a new model of
culpability as awareness of danger to the particular
interests protected by particular offenses.
A number of American cases from the same period
sounded a similar theme. In Commonwealth v. Adams,"30 a
Massachusetts court held that it was not assault and
battery for the speeding driver of a sleigh to run down a
pedestrian inadvertently. The court reasoned that the
willful violation of a speeding ordinance does not supply
the necessary intent for assault and battery. Nevertheless,
the court did express willingness to transfer intent from
one offense to another if the intended offense were malum
in se-suggesting that evil motive would always supply the
requisite culpability, even if unlawful motive would not.
American courts were far more likely to invoke the
irrelevance of motive maxim in excluding evidence of good
motive, as in Respublica v. Caldwell. In Reynolds v. United
States, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the bigamy
conviction of a Mormon in Utah, agreeing that defendant
was not excused by his religious belief that he faced
damnation if he did not pursue polygamy; "[elvery act
128. Regina v. Pembliton, 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 119 (1874).
129. Regina v. Faulkner, 11 Ir. R.-C.L. 8 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1877).
130. Commonwealth v. Adams, 114 Mass. 323 (1873).
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necessary to constitute the crime was knowingly done, and
the crime was therefore knowingly committed," the Court
concluded.' In United States v. Harmon, a federal court
upheld a conviction for distributing obscenity despite
defendant's claim that the document he distributed was an
expos6 of the abuses of prostitution, aimed at improving
rather than harming public morals; the court inveighed
that:
[T]he proposition is that a man can do no public wrong who
believes that what he does is for the ultimate public good.
The underlying vice of all this character of argument is that
it leaves out of view the existence of the social compact, and
the idea of government by law.... Guiteau stoutly
maintained to the end his sanity, and that he felt he had a
patriotic mission to fulfil in taking off President Garfield, to
the salvation of a political party. The Hindu mother cast
her babe to the advouring Ganges to appease the gods. But
civilized society says both are murderers. The Mormon
contends that his religion teaches polygamy; and there is a
school of so-called "modern thinkers" who would abolish
monogamy.... All these claim liberty of conscience and
thought as the basis of their dogmas, and the pro bono
publico as the strength of their claim to indulgence.'32
In State v. Torphy, a Missouri court overturned a gambling
conviction on the ground that defendant's purpose of
gathering evidence against the other gamblers precluded
his culpability for joining in the game; but Judge Ellison
dissented, arguing
Defendant.. .did the thing prohibited by the statute, and he
did it purposefully, that is, intentionally. It will not do to
say that he had no intention to gamble, for he did gamble,
but said he did so with the view of detecting others. That
was merely his motive, as distinguished from his intention.
His intention was to do the act prohibited and his motive
was to catch others. But one's motive, however sincere, will
131. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).
132. United States v. Harmon, 45 F. 414, 422 (D. Kan. 1891).
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not excuse his violation of the penal statute .... 1 Bishop's
Crim. Law, sec. 341.... 1 Wharton's Crim. Law, sec. 119."'
The irrelevance of motive was also a prominent theme
in the criminal law scholarship of the late nineteenth
century. The most influential exponents of the irrelevance
of motive maxim were James Fitzjames Stephen and Oliver
Wendell Holmes. Stephen explained the irrelevance of
motive maxim as necessary to the legal scientific program
of analyzing criminal liability into its component elements,
while Holmes explained the maxim more in utilitarian
terms.
Stephen was probably the first author to argue that
mens rea should be understood simply as the disparate
mental elements of offenses rather than as some quality of
mind or character common to all offenders. He complained
that the maxim 'Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea,'
suggests fallacies which it does not precisely state. It is
frequently though ignorantly supposed to mean that there
cannot be such a thing as legal guilt where there is no moral
guilt, which is obviously untrue, as there is always a
possibility of a conflict between law and morals. It also
suggests the notion that there is some state of mind called a
'mens rea,' the absence of which, on any particular occasion,
deprives what would otherwise be a crime of its criminal
character. This is also untrue.... The truth is that the
maxim about 'mens rea' means no more than that the
definition of all or nearly all crimes contains not only an
outward and visible element, but a mental element, varying
according to the different nature of different crimes....
Hence the only means of arriving at a full comprehension of
the expression "mens rea" is by a detailed examination of
the definitions of particular crimes, and therefore the
expression itself is unmeaning.
3
1
In analyzing the definitions of crimes, Stephen
employs a distinction between motive and intent similar to
133. State v. Torphy, 78 Mo. App. 206, 209 (1899).
134. 2 James F. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 95 (1883).
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Austin's. For Stephen, an actor may choose to act on a
motive or not, whereas intentions always accompany
actions. Motives are desires, whereas intentions can
include expected consequences that may be desired for
many reasons, or not at all:
Intention... is the result of deliberation upon motives, and
is the object aimed at by the action caused or accompanied
by the act or volition. Though this appears to me to be the
proper and accurate meaning of the word it is frequently
used and understood as being synonymous with motives. It
is very common to say that a man's intentions were good
when it is meant that his motives were good, and to argue
that his intention was not what it really was, because the
motive which led him to act as he did was the prevailing
feeling in his mind at the time that he acted rather than the
desire to produce the particular result which his conduct
was intended to produce .... A puts a loaded pistol to B's
temple and shoots B through the head deliberately, and
knowing that the pistol is loaded and that the wound must
certainly be mortal. It is obvious that in every such case the
intention of A must be to kill B. On the other hand, the act
in itself throws no light whatever on A's motives for killing
B.... The motive may have been a desire for revenge, or a
desire for plunder, or a wish on A's part to defend himself
against an attack by B, or a desire to kill an enemy in
battle, or to put a man already mortally wounded out of his
agony. In all these cases the intention is the same, but the
motives are different.
135
For Stephen, intentions are compound mental states,
combining volitions and expectations. They are
consequences not merely desired, but chosen or accepted,
as the likely consequences of acts that are chosen. Thus
there are intentions (expected consequences of acts) that
are not motives, because not desired. And there are
motives (desired ends) that are not intentions, because not
acted upon.
135. Id. at 110.
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But there is a problem with Stephen's scheme: for
there are many motives (desired ends) which are also
intentions, because they are expected consequences of
actions that they motivate. Thus, Stephen seems to include
among intentions "the desire to produce the particular
result which his conduct was intended to produce." At the
same time, he seems to exclude from intentions the
expectations that a killing will lead to revenge or plunder
or defense. So the difference between desire and
expectation does not really explain his distinction between
motive and intent. Motives seem to be simply desires to
produce, or expectations of producing, consequences that
are not proscribed by law. Intentions seem to be simply
desires to produce, or expectations of producing,
consequences that are proscribed. And Stephen's point
seems to be that since every action has many consequences,
it is possible to have many expectations or hopes about the
consequences of an action. As long as the prosecution
proves the desire for or expectation of a proscribed result, it
need not disprove an additional expectation of a lawful
result. Thus, Stephen argues
The maxim [that a man must be held to -intend the
natural consequences of his act] ... is valuable as conveying
a warning against two common fallacies, namely, the
confusion between motive and intention, and the tendency
to deny an immediate intention because of the existence,
real or supposed, of some ulterior intention. For instance, it
will often be argued that a prisoner ought to be acquitted of
wounding a policeman with intent to do him grievous bodily
harm, because his intention was not to hurt the policeman,
but only to escape his pursuit .... [N]othing can be more
illogical than to argue that a man did not entertain a given
intention because he had a motive for entertaining it. The
supposition that the presence of an ulterior intention takes
away the primary immediate intention is a fallacy of the
same sort. It is well illustrated by a case... in which
Woodbourne and Coke were indicted.., for wounding
Crispe 'with intent to maim and disfigure him.'
Woodbourne, at Coke's instigation, struck Crispe about the
head and face with a billhook seven distinct blows. Coke...
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defended himself on the grounds that he intended
Woodbourne to kill Crispe, and not to disfigure him; but the
judge who tried the case ... pointed out to the jury that the
instrument used ... was "in its own nature proper to cut
and disfigure; and if the intention was to murder you are to
consider whether the means made use of to effect and
accomplish that murder and the consequence of those
means were not in the intention and design of the party."136
That one intention, whether guilty or innocent, does
not preclude another seems sensible enough. But this
hardly shows that the second intention is irrelevant to
liability. Sometimes two different intentions are
incompatible: the intent to borrow precludes the intent to
steal. Sometimes a second intention enhances liability:
today, Woodbourne and Coke would be guilty of attempted
murder as well as mayhem. Sometimes a second intention
exculpates: thus, the intent to prevent a crime or save a life
may justify or excuse. In all these cases, nothing turns on
calling the second intention a motive. Stephen assumed
that talking about intent rather than motive would confine
analysis to offense elements and recognized defenses. But
he never succeeded in distinguishing the two concepts.
Indeed, a few years earlier Francis Wharton had taken
much the same position, while using the terms motive and
intent interchangeably:
The will... acts generally under a variety of motives, some
very complex. ... And the law is that, if among the motives
leading to a particular act, one is illegal, this is sufficient to
add to the act the essential evil intent, no matter how strong
may be other concurrent intents. Thus intending ultimate
good is no defense to an indictment for nuisance; intending to
return the goods, no defense to an indictment for
embezzlement; intending to restore lost goods on a reward, no
defense to an indictment for larceny; intending to rid the
community of a bad man, no defense to an indictment for
homicide. No matter what other intents existed, if the intent
136. Id. at 111-12.
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to do the particular unlawful act is either proved or implied,
the offense if committed, is complete.137
Wharton's use of motive and intent as interchangeable
terms did not preclude him from arguing that criminal
litigation should be confined to offense elements and
recognized defenses, which is what Stephen intended to
achieve by advocating the irrelevance of motive.
In Holmes's terminology, the motive for an act was one
among the many purposes with which the actor acted: the
"ultimate" one. Intentions included both purposes and
expectations. Yet motive and intent were not really
distinct categories, for Holmes. Instead, they were points
along an axis between subjective and objective standards of
liability. In the utilitarian tradition, Holmes argued that
the purpose of punishment was to control external
behavior, rather than to judge defendants morally or to
reform their desires. From Holmes's point of view,
culpability was relevant only because behavior that the
defendant could not control was undeterrable. Moreover,
even deterrability was relevant only in so far as it could be
proven. Accordingly, Holmes sought to replace subjective
standards of liability with reasonable person standards.
Those who caused harm to societal interests would be
criminally liable to the extent that they acted under
circumstances which would have alerted a reasonable
person to the danger of harm. Enforcing such objective
standards of behavior even against individuals who were
incapable of meeting them would deter others.
As far as Holmes was concerned, a purpose of doing
harm was hard to prove and irrelevant: one who knew his
action would cause harm was more dangerous than one
who merely hoped it would. In deciding what conduct to
deter, what mattered was how dangerous it was, not why a
defendant was willing to impose that danger. Thus Holmes
concluded that the purpose to kill should be unnecessary
for murder liability:
137. 1 Francis Wharton, A Treatise on Criminal Law 646-47 (7th ed. 1874).
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Malice, as used in common speech, includes intent, and
something more. When an act is said to be done with an
intent to do harm, it is meant that a wish for the harm is
the motive of the act. Intent, however, is perfectly
consistent with the harm being regretted as such, and being
wished only as a means to something else. But when an act
is said to be done maliciously, it is meant, not only that a
wish for the harmful effect is the motive, but also that the
harm is wished for its own sake .... Now it is apparent...
that of these two elements of malice the intent alone is
material to murder. It is just as much murder to shoot a
sentry for the purpose of releasing a friend, as to shoot him
because you hate him. Malice, in the definition of murder,
has not the same meaning as in common speech, and...
has been thought to mean criminal intention.
But intent again will be found to resolve itself into two
things; foresight that certain consequences will follow from
an act, and the wish for those consequences working as a
motive which induces the act. The question then is,
whether intent, in its turn, can be reduced to a lower
term.... [I]t can be, and... knowledge that the act will
probably cause death, that is, foresight of the consequences
of the act, is enough in murder as in tort.
For instance, a newly born child is laid naked out of
doors, where it must perish as a matter of course. This is
none the less murder, that the guilty party would have been
very glad to have a stranger find the child and save it.
138
Having equated motive with intent and intent with
expectation, Holmes went further, and argued that
reasonable expectation was the functional equivalent of
actual expectation.
But again, what is foresight of the consequences? ...
Again we must seek a reduction to lowest terms, If the
known present state of things is such that the act done will
certainly cause death, and the probability is a matter of
common knowledge, one who does the act, knowing the
present state of things, is guilty of murder, and the law will
not inquire whether he did actually foresee the
138. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 44-45 (1881).
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consequences or not. The test of foresight is not what this
very criminal foresaw, but what a man of reasonable
prudence would have foreseen.139
For Holmes, the irrelevance of motive was part of a larger
argument that all subjective standards of liability were
pointless from a utilitarian standpoint. Cognitive
standards were better than desiderative standards, but
standards of objective reasonableness were better still.
Thus for Holmes, the irrelevance of motive was not a
description of prevailing doctrine, but a normative claim
about the true function of criminal liability. When
proclaimed by Holmes, the irrelevance of motive was the
slogan for a sweeping program of doctrinal reform.
By the early twentieth century, the distinction
between motive and intent was familiar and the
irrelevance of the former to criminal liability had become
an accepted maxim of the criminal law. The following
statement from Clark and Marshall's turn of the century
treatise is typical:
It is a clear principle of law that motive does not enter
into any crime as an essential ingredient. Neither failure to
prove any motive nor proof of a good motive will prevent
conviction. .. . [I]f it otherwise appear to [the jury's]
satisfaction that [the accused] did do the act, and that he did
it willfully and without justification or excuse, the fact that
no motive is shown is altogether immaterial .... A willful
act prohibited and made punishable by the common law or
by statute is none the less a crime because the accused was
actuated by a good motive. ... For example, on a
prosecution for depositing in the mails or publishing an
obscene article or book it is no defense for the accused to
show that his object was to correct evils and abuses in
intercourse between the sexes, and thus do a public good.
And on a prosecution for a nuisance in erecting a wharf on
public property it is no defense to show that it has been in
fact beneficial to the public. Since a good motive is no
excuse,... a man cannot set up his religious belief to escape
139. Id.
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liability for violation of a statute punishing ... polygamy, or
punishing labor on Sunday, or the disinterring of a dead
body, or the beating of a drum in the streets of a town.14°
At mid-century, Jerome Hall reiterated the irrelevance
of motive maxim and insisted on the centrality of the
distinction between motive and intent. As far as Hall was
concerned, mens rea had a clear meaning: it was the intent
to harm, or the reckless disregard of a risk of harming
another person. Hall regarded mens rea in this sense as a
moral prerequisite to criminal liability, so that strict
liability and negligence liability were both illegitimate in
criminal law. According to Hall, the intent or recklessness
on which mens rea depended were clearly distinguishable
from motive. An actor's motive was her reason for
intentionally imposing harm or risk. According to Hall,
moral blameworthiness depended on both an actor's intent
to impose harm or risk, and the moral worth of her motives
for doing so.1 But even though moral blameworthiness
depended in part on motive, Hall insisted that motive was
irrelevant to criminal liability. Motives were too various to
be codified: their moral worth had to be assessed on a case
by case basis at sentencing.4 The legality values that had
inspired lawyers to define the mental elements of offenses
could not be realized by defining bad motives.
Jurists propounding the irrelevance of motive drew the
distinction between motive and intent in at least three
different ways: motive referred to the actor's purposes, or
her ultimate purposes, or her purposes beyond those
required for criminal liability. Intent usually referred to
those consequences of action that the actor expected or,
perhaps, desired. Yet it might refer only to relatively
immediate expectations or desires, or only to inculpatory
expectations or desires. The irrelevance of motive maxim
was associated with the proposition that assessment of an
actor's culpability should focus on the mental element of a
140. Clark & Marshall, supra note 3, at 149-51.
141. Hall, supra note 1, at 149, 157, 161.
142. Id. at 162-63.
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particular offense. Usually this mental element would
involve acting with awareness of the danger of causing, or
the desire to cause some proscribed harm. The irrelevance
of motive maxim also was understood to imply that good
motives or religious motives should not excuse or justify
offenses, despite the fact that many recognized defenses did
absolve offenders because of their motives.
The irrelevance of motive maxim was associated with a
number of reform projects: defining the elements of offenses
precisely, establishing a legislative monopoly on
criminalization by eliminating common law crimes, and
organizing the criminal law around the utilitarian aim of
deterring dangerous conduct. Yet these different projects
had different, and ultimately incompatible, premises and
vocabularies. The legal scientific project of offense definition
used a conception of intent as a legally proscribed
expectation or desire to impose harm. The utilitarian
project of deterrence used a conception of motive as desire'
rather than expectation. Thus the legal scientific conception
of intent and the utilitarian conception of motive were not
mutually exclusive terms. The opposition of these
intersecting terms left the irrelevance of motive doctrine
vulnerable to the charge that it was indeterminate.
V. CRITICISMS OF THE IRRELEVANCE OF MOTIVE MAXIM
In the twentieth century, critics mounted three types
of arguments against the irrelevance of motive maxim: (1)
logical critiques of the irrelevance of motive maxim as
premised on a false dichotomy between motive and intent;
(2) empirical claims that the irrelevance of motive was false
as a description of established criminal law; and (3)
normative arguments that criminal liability should be
conditioned on motive because it is relevant to moral
blame. Often, arguments of the first two types would be
intertwined, as critics would argue that no distinction could
be drawn between motive and intent that would make the
irrelevance of motive claim descriptively true, as opposed to
true only by definition.
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A. Descriptive and Logical Objections
John Salmond was the first scholar to raise questions
about the motive/intent distinction, in his 1902 treatise,
Jurisprudence. Walter Wheeler Cook and Walter Hitchler
extended his arguments. More recently, Douglas Husak
has amplified them further. Salmond, Cook, and Hitchler
argued that a purely cognitive conception of intent, of the
kind endorsed by the utilitarians Bentham, Austin, and
Holmes, accorded with neither ordinary nor legal usage. If
intent was confined to cognitive states, the proposition that
criminal liability turned only on intent, and not motive,
was descriptively false. Therefore, intended consequences
had to include desired consequences as well as expected
consequences. Salmond, Cook, and Hitchler also rejected
the utilitarians' inclusion of consequences recognized as
merely probable among those intended. There was a
moral, and often a legal difference between knowingly
endangering and knowingly harming. Thus intended
consequences were those desired or seen as necessarily
following from an act. In the language of the Model Penal
Code, intent included purpose and knowledge.
Working with a partly desiderative conception of
intent, Salmond had to acknowledge that motive was not
distinguishable from intent. Instead, a motive was really a
kind of intent, one that was distant or ulterior relative to
some more immediate intent. Thus almost any intent
might be considered a motive when considered in relation
to some more immediate intent: the intent to kill might be
the motive for stabbing a victim, the intent to stab the
motive for thrusting a knife, the intent to thrust the knife
the motive for thrusting the hand.
In law, the intent commanding attention would be
whatever intent sufficed to inculpate the actor, usually the
intent to commit some proscribed harm. Following the
utilitarians, Salmond reasoned that the intent to harm was
never an offender's ultimate purpose: people harmed others
only to benefit or gratify themselves in some way. This
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intention to gratify the self was the motive for intentionally
harming another.'
This conception of motive as a desire to benefit or
gratify one's self, fit with the traditional utilitarian
argument that conditioning punishment on motive was
normatively wrong. For utilitarians, the end of self-
gratification was healthy and efficacious, when considered
apart from harmful means for pursuing it. It was both
impossible and undesirable to use legal sanctions to
suppress the desire to gratify the self. But since this
hedonistic motive for wrongdoing was, by definition, not
part of the intent that made the act wrong, it was, also by
definition, irrelevant to criminal liability. Accordingly,
Salmond's definition of motive also fit with the descriptive
claim that motive was irrelevant to criminal liability.
Unfortunately, Salmond's definition seemed to
reconcile the irrelevance of motive claim with existing
criminal law at the price of reducing that claim to a
tautology. It excluded motives from the criteria of criminal
liability by defining motive in terms of irrelevance to
criminal liability. As Husak comments, "criminal theorists
attempting to make sense of a principle, frequently 'defend'
it by construing it as true by definition. What is initially
put forward as an important substantive claim is
interpreted as an uninformative tautology. "144
Avoiding tautology, Cook and Hitchler defined motive
more broadly, as any relatively remote intent. For Cook, a
motive was any end desired and intended to be brought
about by means of some other desired and intended
consequence of action. This definition implied that, for any
criminal act, after one had enumerated all the requisite
intentions for criminal liability, one could specify further
intentions or "motives" that would not be relevant to
criminal liability. But it also implied that any
incriminating intent for which one could identify a more
immediate intent, would be a "motive," and would
143. John Salmond, Jurisprudence: Or, the Theory of Law 417-419 (1902).
144. Douglas N. Husak, Philosophy of Criminal Law 144 (1987).
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nevertheless be relevant to criminal liability. 145  Husak
points out
The difficulty with this account is that it relativizes the
distinction between intention and motive to moments of
time. An intention ceases to remain a motive as soon as it
becomes immediate. When actions are examined
retrospectively, as in criminal trials, there may be no
intentions that are not also motives.
146
Cook and Hitchler were content to collapse the
motive/intent distinction in this way because they rejected
the irrelevance of motive maxim. Each proceeded to list
examples of what they called "motives" that were relevant
to criminal liability. These included exculpatory motives
for the otherwise criminal use of force, such as the purposes
of defending one's self or preventing a felony.147  These
motives support affirmative defenses of justification. They
might have added motives supporting other affirmative
defenses. Thus, the motive of averting greater harm
supports the defense of lesser evils; the motive of avoiding
being subjected to unlawful force supports the excuse of
duress; the motive of averting imminent harm supports the
excuse of necessity; and the motive of retaliation for the
unlawful use of force supports the excuse of provocation.
Considering these examples, we might conclude that while
defendants may justify or excuse criminal offenses on the
basis of good motives, prosecutors should never be required
to prove a bad motive as an offense element.
Yet, in addition to the exculpatory use of motives in
defining defenses, Hitchler drew attention to the
inculpatory use of motives in defining offenses. Hitchler
pointed to wholly inchoate offenses such as attempt and
conspiracy, in which an act becomes criminal only if
committed with the unachieved purpose of causing some
145. Walter Wheeler Cook, Act, Intention, and Motive in the Criminal Law, 26
Yale L.J. 645, 660-61 (1917).
146. Husak, supra note 144, at 145.
147. Cook, supra note 145, at 661-62; Walter H. Hitchler, Motive as an
Essential Element of Crime, 35 Dick. L. Rev. 105, 113-14 (1931).
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harm. He also noted partially inchoate offenses like
burglary and robbery, in which a relatively minor criminal
act such as trespass or assault is aggravated into a more
serious offense by an unachieved purpose to commit an
additional crime such as theft.148  Hitchler could have
included felony murder, which in most instances
aggravates negligent homicide to murder based on the
purpose of committing a serious felony. Finally, Hitchler
mentions crimes defined by reference to culpability terms
like "fraudulently" or "corruptly," that imply a purpose to
acquire some undeserved benefit.
The criticisms of the motive/intent distinction
developed by Salmond, Cook, and Hitchler have persuaded
leading authorities on criminal law, without quite killing
off the irrelevance of motive maxim. Consider the following
discussion by Glanville Williams, in which he concedes that
the irrelevance of motive claim is indeterminate,
tautologous. or descriptively false, and yet opts to preserve
it as an empty tautology for unexplained reasons of
"convenience:"
[M]otive is ulterior intention-the intention with which
an intentional act is done. Intention, when distinguished
from motive, relates to the means, motive to the end; yet the
end may be the means to another end, and the word
"intention" is appropriate to such medial end. Much of what
men do involves a chain of intention.., and each intention
is a motive for that preceding it. In criminal law, it is
generally convenient to use the term "intention" with
reference to intention as to the constituents of the actus
reus, and the term "motive" with reference to the intention
with which these constituents were brought about.
The definition of some crimes involves an intention to
commit another crime.... It is commonly called by lawyers
a "specific intent." The same usage is adopted where the
intent required for the crime is to bring about some result
that in itself is not necessarily criminal. Forgery, for
example, requires an intent to defraud or deceive.... The
148. Hitchler, supra note 147, at 111, 113-14.
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intent is referred to by lawyers as a "specific intent" rather
than as a motive....
If the forgoing definition of motive is accepted, it
becomes tautologous to say that motive is irrelevant to legal
responsibility.149
Williams goes on to concede that several offenses are
defined by reference to motives. He does not object to the
mental elements of these offenses, but recommends that
they be referred to as "ulterior intentions" rather than
"motives," for the sake of "convenience."'5 ° Wayne LaFave
also wonders "if the notion that motives are irrelevant in
the substantive law requires that the word 'motive' be
defined as those purposes and objectives which are deemed
irrelevant.. . ."I" He suggests that it "would be better to
abandon the difficult task of trying to distinguish intent
from motive and merely acknowledge that the substantive
criminal law takes account of some desired ends but not
others. 152  Yet in the end, he adheres to the maxim by
arbitrarily designating any inculpatory or exculpatory
purpose an intent rather than a motive.'53 Thus, he
replaces the descriptive claim that motive is irrelevant
with a definitional claim. Joshua Dressier, by contrast,
simply rejects the maxim as descriptively false.14
B. Normative Objections
More recent critics have added normative criticisms to
these logical and empirical criticisms of the irrelevance of
motive maxim. Husak argues that we take actors' motives
into account in making everyday moral judgments"' and
complains that the irrelevance of motive doctrine "has had
a pernicious impact upon the disposition of a number of
149. Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part 48-49 (2d ed. 1961).
150. Id. at 50.
151. Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 244 (3d ed. 2000).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 245.
154. Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 121 (3d ed. 2001).
155. Husak, supra note 144, at 144.
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cases, most notably those involving benevolent euthanasia.
It is monstrous that a defendant should be convicted of the
most serious offense known to the criminal law when he
lovingly and regretfully complies with a request to kill his
suffering and incurable spouse."156
Hyman Gross offered a more fundamental objection to
the irrelevance of motive principle. Gross rejected the
purely cognitive model of responsibility advanced by the
utilitarians. On his view, culpability has four
"dimensions." The culpability attending an action depends
on the (1) probability and (2) gravity of harm resulting from
that action, (3) the extent of the actor's intentionality with
respect to that danger, and (4) the legitimacy of the
purpose for which the act is committed. For example,
suppose an actor throws a rock at a group of boys taunting
him, in order to frighten them away. The rock strikes one
of them, causing his death. Although the actor did not
wish to hit any of the children, he recognized that this was
highly probable. If the charge is homicide, the actor's
culpability is a function of the actor's recklessness with
respect to the relatively low danger of the very grave harm
of death, when measured against the at best slight
legitimacy of his reasons for acting (frightening children to
protest their taunting him). Now this last dimension of
culpability, the legitimacy of the actor's purposes, is a
question of how good or evil the actor's motives were.
According to Gross, this inquiry into the moral worth of the
actor's purposes is always relevant to culpability and
should be part of the criteria for measuring the criminal
liability of every offender. 157
Yet Gross argued that for offenses involving actual
harm or even danger, no special inculpatory motive need be
proven ordinarily. The obligation to allege an exculpatory
motive lies with the offender. On the other hand, an
illegitimate motive must be proven where it aggravates
liability for imposing harm or danger. An example might
156. Id. at 148.
157. Hyman Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice 77-88, 103-06 (1979).
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be an assault with intent to intimidate a witness.
Similarly, a "malicious" motive like spite might aggravate
liability for intentionally destroying another's property. 158
In addition, where the dangerous or harmful conduct
consists of some socially or even constitutionally valued
activity like speech, a legitimate motive may be presumed.
So an obscenity offense may require proof that a redeeming
expressive purpose was absent; a criminal libel may
require proof of a malicious purpose to injure."9 Official
corruption offenses may involve harmless conduct,
inculpated only by an illegitimate motive which must
therefore, be proven. 6 ' So legitimacy of motive is always a
dimension of culpability, but need only be pled in
exceptional cases.
Some of the scholars collected in this symposium have
developed Gross's idea that legitimacy of motive is an
independent dimension of culpability. Ken Simons, Kyron
Huigens, and Sam Pillsbury have analyzed depraved
indifference to human life, recklessness, and negligence as
compound forms of culpability, involving both cognitive and
desiderative components. On this view, ascribing
culpability involves evaluating an offender's practical
reasoning, examining not only her willingness to impose
risk, but also the purposes for which she imposes those
risks. '6  Consider some hypothetical killers who act
without intent to kill:
(1) A surgeon routinely defrauds his patients by failing
to use an anesthesiologist for procedures requiring
one. Some of them die.
158. Id. at 106.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 463
(1992); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1423 (1995);
Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49 Rutgers L. Rev. 105 (1996). For
trenchant criticism of the desiderative dimension of this two dimensional model of
culpability, see Kimberly Ferzan's contribution to this symposium.
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(2) To save money, a commuter delays fixing his brakes
but continues to drive his car. His brakes fail at an
intersection and cause a fatal collision.
(3) A parolee, pulled over by a police officer has a gun in
the car in violation of his parole. He speeds way to
avoid arrest, loses control of his vehicle, and collides
with another vehicle, killing the driver.
(4) The same, except it is the officer giving chase who
collides.
(5) A hunter fires a gun at some rustling bushes and
kills another hunter.
(6) In a popular state park, a hiker fires a gun over the
heads of a picnicking family, in order to frighten
them, and kills another hiker in the bushes.
In both of the first two examples, offenders impose risk on
others to save themselves money. But the surgeon does so
in order to steal from his patients. This antisocial purpose
aggravates his reckless imposition of risk to depraved
indifference to human life, and so aggravates his liability
from manslaughter to murder. The commuter is negligent
or reckless only. The parolee has a socially harmful reason
for speeding, whereas the officer has a socially beneficial
one. The officer may be justified, or only negligent. The
parolee may be reckless or depraved. The hunter and the
hiker arguably impose similar risks, in that both fire guns
in the woods under circumstances where other persons may
be present. But the hiker's antisocial purpose makes him
more likely to be judged reckless or depraved. In all these
cases, the purpose for which the offender imposes risk
seems relevant to culpability because it expresses the value
he or she places on human life.
Alan Michaels has argued that even seemingly
cognitive criteria of culpability, like knowledge of harm or
risk have implicit desiderative dimensions. Why, Michaels
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asks, do we punish those who cause harm knowingly, but
not purposely? Imagine two witnesses to an accident, who
are helpless to prevent it. One hopes the accident will
occur and the other hopes it won't. The mental state of the
first witness seems reprehensible, while the mental state of
the second seems blameless. Michaels argues that mere
knowledge of harm by itself is not culpable. When an
offender causes harm knowingly, however, she has
accepted that harm will occur as a consequence of her act.
Even if she regrets the harm, she desires some other
consequence of her action enough to outweigh this regret.
If the social value of this consequence in fact outweighs the
harm, she may well be justified. But if not, her acceptance
of the harm expresses bad values. The fault even in
knowing harm, then, is in the desires moving the actor
rather than in the knowledge itself. 162
If these scholars are right, "motive" is part of the
calculus of culpability for crimes imposing risk and harm,
not only for inchoate crimes and those conditioned on
unusual culpability terms like "maliciously,"
"fraudulently," or "corruptly." On this reasoning, motive is,
whether or not explicitly, part of the mental element of
every offense.
Other scholars have defended the desiderative aspect
of defenses. Dan Kahan (along with his coauthor Martha
Nussbaum), Victoria Nourse, and Sam Pillsbury have all
argued that the partial defense of provocation
appropriately mitigates murder liability on the basis-but
only on the basis-of sympathetic reasons for killing.
163
These scholars reject the prevailing understanding of
provocation as a partial interference with the offender's
volition. They reason that an account of excusing
162. Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 953 (1998).
163. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in
Criminal Law, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 269 (1996); Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress:
Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 Yale L.J. 1331 (1997), The
New Normativity: The Abuse Excuse and the Resurgence of Judgment in the
Criminal Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1435 (1998) (book review); Samuel H. Pillsbury,
Judging Evil: Rethinking the Law of Murder and Manslaughter 125-60 (1998).
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conditions as impediments to volition is vulnerable to the
deteriminist argument that all acts are caused. Rather
than viewing provocation as an impairment of volition,
they regard the provoked killer as an autonomous decision
maker, who kills for reasons that may be more or less
justifiable.
The pattern of provocation analysis these scholars
recommend can be illustrated by comparing some
hypothetical cases. Consider four killers:
(1) Bob, a man of limited education and means, feels
little control over his own fate. He is accordingly
very emotionally invested in controlling his wife.
When she attempts to leave him, he kills her.
(2) Sue learns that a neighbor has molested her five-
year-old daughter. Her daughter is traumatized,
and will likely find it difficult to testify. Sue kills
the neighbor.
(3) Wade, deeply ashamed of his own homoerotic
impulses, kills a pair of homosexuals kissing on a
park bench.
(4) Bill, a drug addict, kills and robs an elderly priest to
support his drug habit. Physically ravaged by his
addiction, Bill targets the priest because he knows
he is an easy victim: frail, trusting, and living alone.
All four killings were partially "caused" by
circumstances. In the first three cases, these causes
involved strong emotions. Yet whether we mitigate murder
liability will depend more on the worth of those emotions
than on their strength. Bob and Wade kill on the basis of
anger that is unjustifiable. Their crimes therefore express
atrocious values, and should not be mitigated. Sue makes
an unjustifiable decision, in killing, but she makes that
decision on the basis of a justifiable anger. Thus the values
expressed by Sue's decision to kill are also defective, but
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much less so. It follows that mitigation is appropriate.
Bill's killing is as much caused by circumstances as Sue's.
Yet most readers will feel that Bill is responsible for
choosing to kill the priest, and that this choice also
expresses very reprehensible values. According to Kahan,
Nourse, and Pillsbury, the defense of provocation
appropriately invites the jury to evaluate the killer's
reasons for killing-her motives, as it were.
Claire Finkelstein has proposed a similar analysis of
the defense of duress, as an evaluation of the defendant's
reasons for committing crime. Rather than simply asking
how afraid the offender was, the duress defense asks how
reasonably or justifiably afraid she was. The justifiability
of fear depends on the gravity and probability of harm
apparent to the actor, but also on the actor's responsibility
for placing herself in danger of harm, and of being
pressured into crime. Did she join a gang? Did she go into
debt to a violent drug dealer? The duress defense also
evaluates the offender's decision-making in light of her
fear. Did she appropriately weigh the interests of others
before succumbing to her fear? Or did she kill in order to
avoid a black eye? Thus understood, the duress defense is
concerned not with the extent to which the offender's crime
was determined, but with an assessment of the values
expressed by the crime.164 Finkelstein has also explained
self-defense claims as assertions of the worth of an
offender's reasons for using force. In so doing, she rejects
alternative accounts of self-defense as involuntary action
and as socially beneficial action.166
C. The Expressive Argument for Punishing Motives
Underlying these arguments is a distinctive conception
of criminal liability that stands at odds with the utilitarian
theory of punishment underwriting the irrelevance of
164. Claire 0. Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense in
Law, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 251 (1995).




motive maxim. According to the moral philosopher Jean
Hampton, crime and punishment are both expressions of
value. To harm or endanger another person is to assert the
superiority of one's own purposes over the purposes of other
people. In some cases this is legitimate, as where one's
purpose is to prevent the other person from wronging
someone else. But where one's purposes are not morally
superior, to inflict harm or danger on others in pursuing
them is to claim a superior status over others. Punishment
appropriately condemns the values asserted by the offender
in committing her crime, and vindicates the law's
commitment to the equal worth of every person.
On Hampton's view, punishment necessarily expresses
a moral judgment of the actor's reasons for acting.
166
Otherwise, it is just a price, a means of optimizing certain
consequences. But if punishment is nothing more than a
price, expressing no moral judgment of the offender's
values, it becomes hard to justify its infliction of suffering.
Hampton's expressive account of punishment rejects the
utilitarian premise that all desires are equally good. It
accords with Martha Nussbaum's position that we can
subject the passions to moral judgment, affirming some
desires as worthy and condemning others.
167
In its intellectual origins, the irrelevance of motive
maxim is closely connected with a dubious premise of
classical liberalism, the assumption that people are by and
large able to pursue their ends without affecting, and so
without harming others. 6 ' The legal realists criticized this
premise as underestimating the interdependence of market
166. Jean Hampton, Punishment as Defeat, in Forgiveness and Mercy 124
(Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988), The Moral Education Theory of
Punishment, 13 Phil. & Pub. Aft. 208 (1984); see also Guyora Binder, Meaning
and Motive in the Law of Homicide, 3 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 755 (2000) (review
essay); Dan M. Kahan, Two Liberal Fallacies in the Hate Crimes Debate in 20
Law & Phil. 175 (2001).
167. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 163; Martha C. Nussbaum, Love's
Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (1990).
168. On this principle see generally, Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights
Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. Rev.
975; Kahan, supra note 166.
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actors in a modern economy. 169 Modern social actors are
constantly trying to use resources in incompatible ways.
There are no spheres within which they can act without
affecting the interests of others.
But there is another and deeper basis for criticizing
this scenario of social actors each pursuing their ends
within their autonomous spheres of action. The problem is
not just that people want to use the same resources in
inconsistent ways. Their desires do not only concern the
allocation of resources: they also concern the distribution of
happiness itself. Thus, many preferences are not
independent of the welfare of others, but instead are
"relative" preferences, preferences about the welfare of
others. 1" 0  Sadistic and altruistic desires are
straightforward examples of such relative preferences. The
existence of such relative preferences casts doubt on the
utilitarian premise that motives, as opposed to actions, are
morally neutral. If the good consists in maximizing
preference satisfaction, a sadistic desire is perverse. Far
more utility can be achieved in a world populated by
altruists than in a world populated by sadists. Hence,
altruistic preferences would seem to be better, from a
utilitarian standpoint, than sadistic preferences. When
motives concern the welfare of others, then, they matter
morally, even on utilitarian premises.
Moreover, there are grounds for viewing most
preferences as relative preferences about the welfare of
others. Relative preferences include the desire to occupy a
particular social status relative to others, whether of
superiority or equality. Yet preferences regarding the
allocation of resources are never neatly separable from
preferences about social status. Because, as the legal
realists argued, resources always lie at the nexus of
competing uses, control over resources is a social relation.
169. Singer, supra note 168; Barbara Fried, The Progressive Assault on
Laissez-Faire: Robert Hale and the First Law and Economics Movement (1998);
Guyora Binder, Twentieth-Century Legal Metaphors for Self and Society, in
Looking Back at Law's Century 151 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002).
170. Richard H. McAdam, Relative Preferences, 102 Yale L.J. 1 (1992).
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As Michael Walzer has argued, resources matter to people
when they are socially recognized as "goods," when they
acquire some significance within social and cultural
practices as sources of value.171 What most people care
most about are the forms and indices of social status
peculiar to their own societies. In valuing and distributing
goods, we determine who deserves to be rewarded and
recognized according to a variety of scales of value.
Thus, many of our desires are laden with moral
content. They express judgments of value, and imply
judgments about the status and worth of other persons.
And so when an offender acts on a wrongful desire, she also
expresses a view about the relative worth of other persons.
Typically, offenders show selfish indifference to the welfare
of others in wronging them to achieve some benefit for
themselves. But sometimes they act out of anger or hatred
or envy, for the very purpose of decreasing the welfare of
others. The desire to reduce the welfare of others is not
always evil. Our criminal law is premised on the notion
that wrongdoers deserve to suffer. The defense of
provocation reflects the view that the desire to impose
deserved suffering is less culpable than the desire to
impose undeserved suffering.
To sum up the implications of Hampton's expressive
view of punishment, when we punish an actor, we do not
just disapprove and discourage the consequences of her
action. We determine that she caused or risked harm to
others by acting on desires that express a reprehensible
moral attitude toward the worth and welfare of other
people. This means that both criminal acts and criminal
punishment necessarily make statements about the social
status and moral worth of persons. If so, bad "motive" is
indeed an essential part of criminal liability. Moreover,
what makes a motive bad is the basis on which it honors or
degrades persons.
171. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality
3-31 (1983).
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D. An Application to Hate Crimes
This expressive account of crime and punishment has
important implications for one of the most controversial
contemporary issues in criminal justice, the legitimacy of
hate crime liability. If Hampton is right, the criminal law
typically inflicts punishment because an offender has
severely and undeservedly degraded another person by
harming them. We cannot practice punishment on this
basis without making moral judgments about the bases on
which people deserve social status. This means that
condemning those who persecute others to degrade their
status unjustly comes close to the core purpose of the
criminal law. That is why many people regard genocide as
the ultimate crime, the essence of evil. Persecuting an
individual because of her membership in a racial or
religious group expresses contempt for, and claims
superiority over all members of the group. It wrests
resources and liberties way from members of that group by
force and the threat of force.
It has become common to argue that hate crime
liability violates the value of free speech because it adds
punishment for expressing bad values to the punishment
otherwise deserved for imposing harm or risk.17 2 On this
view, attitudes about the worth of other human beings are
merely political opinions, harmless unless acted upon, and
even beneficial because they contribute to the marketplace
of ideas. Hate crime liability seems to simply punish two
offenses, a crime of violence against the person, and an
opinion offense. But because political speech is valued in a
liberal democracy, political opinions cannot be punished
separately, and a crime of violence that expresses a
political opinion is no worse-indeed, is arguably better-
than a crime of violence with no ideological content. This
argument against hate crimes suggests there may be
172. See, e.g., Anthony Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Inquiry into the Theoretical
Foundations of Bias-Crime Statutes, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1015 (1997); James B.




something fundamentally illiberal about the expressive
theory of punishment and about the moral assessment of
offender's motives.
Expressive theorists have two possible lines of
response. One response concedes the expressive theory of
punishment is incompatible with a value-neutral liberalism
and concludes, "so much the worse for value neutral
liberalism." This is the response offered by Dan Kahan.7'
Kahan invokes Hampton's expressive theory in arguing
that criminal law pervasively and appropriately judges the
values motivating acts of violence.174  Such a moral
assessment of an actor's reasons for acting is essential to
the judgment of blameworthy wrongdoing that alone
justifies retribution. A prisoner would be entitled to
complain if he was subjected to punishment without a
judgment blaming him for choosing to act on the wrong
values. So a value-neutral liberalism is arguably
incompatible with retributive punishment which
necessarily compares the values on the basis of which
defendant acted to a societal moral standard. According to
Kahan, a criminal law premised on moral desert cannot be
indifferent to the worth of people's "beliefs, values, and
preferences. 1 Kahan reasons that
Hate crime laws assess the values expressed by an
offender's actions in exactly the same way as the rest of
criminal law. In our society, individuals tend to construct
their identities around their ethnic and religious
affiliations, their genders, and their sexual orientations. An
individual who assaults or kills another on account of one of
these characteristics, then, shows us that he enjoys not only
the suffering of another human being, but also the
experience of domination and mastery associated with
denigrating something that the victim and others regard as
essential to their selves.
76
173. Kahan, supra note 166, at 175.
174. Id. at 180.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 182.
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A second possible response reconciles hate crimes
liability with liberal notions of free speech by pointing to
the necessary limits of liberalism's value-neutrality. Thus,
it asserts that the evaluation of motives generally, and hate
crime liability in particular, are compatible with liberalism
because (1) liberalism, although neutral towards some
values in some contexts, is nevertheless a value theory with
implications for the moral worth of at least some motives,
and (2) using violence to express bigotry is a particularly
egregious violation of liberalism's inherent moral values.
Consider Bruce Ackerman's theory that justice in a
liberal state is the outcome of a rational and neutral
discursive process. Ackerman defines rationality and
neutrality as follows:
Rationality. Whenever anybody questions the legitimacy of
another's power, the power holder must respond not by
suppressing the questioner but by giving a reason that
explains why he is more entitled to the resource than the
questioner is.177
Neutrality. No reason is a good reason if it requires the
power holder to assert:
(a) that his conception of the good is better than
that asserted by any of his fellow citizens, or
(b) that, regardless of his conception of the good,
he is intrinsically superior to one or more of his
fellow citizens.
178
Ackerman's neutrality principle suggests that neither
expressions of bigotry, nor expressions of conceptions of the
good make any contribution to a legitimate political
process. Yet his rationality principle militates against
punishing such expressions. They may be ignored, but not
suppressed. Ackerman's conception of liberalism therefore
militates against punishing hate-speech. But, surprisingly,
it has the opposite implication for hate-crimes, that is,
177. Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 4 (1980).
178. Id. at 11.
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penalty enhancements for crimes of violence that express
bigotry. Ackerman's rationality principle draws a
fundamental distinction between two different modes of
advancing political views: persuasion and coercion. Hate
crimes express political views by means of coercive force
rather than rational persuasion. Ackerman's liberalism
does not protect violent political expression, and it does not
value bigotry.
The apparent conflict between hate crimes liability
and the liberal free speech principle dissolves once we
realize that liberalism does not ascribe value to ideas and
opinions as such. Liberalism maintains a studious
indifference to the content of ideas, substituting a
procedure for a criterion of value. What the liberal free
speech principle favors is only a certain means of
advancing ideas and opinions: through discursive action.
The very concept of freedom of expression is premised on a
distinction between coerced expression and uncoerced
expression. In a hate crime, the offender attempts to
exclude members of a certain group from some aspect of
public life not by rational persuasion, but by force and fear.
Punishing hate speech may restrict speech, but punishing
hate crimes does not.
Not only are hate crime penalty enhancements
compatible with the free speech principle, they honor it.
While a liberal theory like Ackerman's may maintain a
neutral posture towards certain kinds of values
(conceptions of the good) it nevertheless embraces other
values (like rationality). The more one values the principle
that ideas should be promoted by persuasion rather than
coercion, the more one should condemn the use of force to
promote an idea. On this reasoning, it is worse to assault
person to advance a political opinion, than simply to
assault a person. The latter offense expresses contempt for
the safety and well-being of another person; the former
expresses that and also expresses contempt for the value of
free speech as a process for settling differences within a
liberal polity. That is why many people think that terrorist
motives should aggravate liability for murder. Hate crimes
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are a form of terrorism, and enhancing punishment for
terrorist motives seems perfectly compatible with content-
neutral liberalism.
The argument that penalty enhancements for
ideologically motivated crime violates the principle of free
speech mistakenly disaggregates the hate crime into two
components-a crime of violence, and an opinion-as if they
were two completely unrelated phenomena. This effaces the
relationship between a value and the means by which it is
pursued. There is a world of difference between offering
reasons for others to vote for you and keeping them away
from the polls at gun point. The free speech principle values
political discourse but condemns political intimidation.
Political intimidation is a compound wrong, violating
the person and the political autonomy of a victim. The
criminal law punishes many such compound wrongs. Thus,
robbery is an offense against person and property; extortion
is an offense against personal security or privacy and
against personal autonomy; rape is an offense against both
the personal security and the sexual autonomy of a victim.
All of these offenses are viewed as more than the sum of
their parts. When an offender uses force not just to hurt a
victim, but for the further purpose of dominating the
victim's will, the offender demeans the victim in a more
profound way. This expresses a process value that offends
even a liberalism like Ackerman's, that while neutral as to
substantive values, is firmly committed to certain process
values. Such a liberalism may refuse to discriminate
between different political motives for violent crime, but it
may well enhance punishment for any politically motivated
violent crime. In short, there can be a liberal version of the
expressive theory of punishment, and that liberal version
could also enhance penalties for violent crimes motivated
by group hatred.
The expressive theory of punishment insists that all
punishments condemn the values that criminals express
when they wrongly impose harm or risk on others.
Aggravating liability for particularly bad values simply
discriminates among degrees of badness. In this way, it
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accords with Hyman Gross's overall theory of culpability,
which holds that legitimacy of motive is always a
dimension of culpability.
VI. CONTEMPORARY APPLICATIONS OF THE IRRELEVANCE
OF MOTIVE MAXIM
We have seen that over the course of the twentieth
century, critics of the irrelevance of motive maxim have
raised logical, descriptive, and normative objections. They
have argued that as a descriptive matter, the "intentions"
punished by the criminal law include desiderative as well
as cognitive states. They have also argued that as a
normative matter, desiderative states should be evaluated
and punished. They have argued further that if
desiderative states are included within intention, motive
and intent cannot be distinguished from one another as
mental states. As a result, motive cannot be shown to be
irrelevant to criminal liability, except by defining motives
as intentions irrelevant to criminal liability. This last
strategy reduces the irrelevance of motive maxim to an
empty tautology.
Despite these arguments, the irrelevance of motive
maxim survives and continues to be invoked in practical
and theoretical arguments about criminal law. This section
will examine some contemporary legal arguments invoking
the irrelevance of motive maxim and show that they fail in
the ways predicted by the descriptive, logical, and
normative objections.
A. Constructing the Mental Elements of Offenses
Courts are most likely to invoke the maxim in
constructing the mental element of offenses. The typical
scenario involves a partially inchoate offense. Thus, a
legislature imposes a regulation requiring that some
procedure be followed so as to prevent a particular kind of
harm or to achieve a certain benefit. The legislature also
criminalizes violation of the regulation, without clearly
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indicating whether the offense requires any culpability
with respect to the harm feared or the benefit sought.
Defendant requests an instruction that the offense requires
intent to cause the harm or prevent the benefit. The
prosecution responds that so instructing the jury would
require the prosecution to prove "bad motive," or enable the
defense to contest the charge by offering evidence of "good
motive." But, the prosecution continues, motive is
irrelevant to criminal liability. Therefore, the prosecution
concludes, the mental element of the offense is only the
"intent" to evade the regulation, not the "motive" of causing
the harm feared or preventing the benefit sought. This
argument appears to persuade some courts. Yet it is an
empty argument, that offers only a conclusion in place of
any real reason to exclude culpability with respect to the
threatened harm from the mental element of the offense.
Consider five cases illustrating this pattern of
argument:
(1) A soldier refused to be deployed abroad in a war she
considers illegal and immoral. Charged with
"desertion with intent to shirk hazardous duty," she
sought to prove that she sought only to avoid
violating her conscience and international law and
not *to avoid duty or danger. The trial court refused
this proffer of evidence on the ground that it
concerned her motive and so was irrelevant to the
required intent to avoid service that was in fact
hazardous and obligatory. An appellate court
overturned this decision on the ground that the
offense required proof that defendant believed she
had a duty to fight and that her purpose in refusing
to do so was to protect herself from danger.
7 9
(2) A bank officer circumvented bank procedures to loan
money to a friend who was a poor credit risk.
Charged with "willful misapplication of funds," he
179. United States v. Huet-Vaughn, 39 M.J. 545 (A.C.M.R. 1994).
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requested an instruction requiring proof that he
intended to permanently deprive the bank of money.
The court refused this instruction, concluding that
the offense required proof only of intent to use the
funds without the bank's consent. The court
reasoned that a purpose to permanently deprive the
bank of the money would be a motive rather than an
intent, and motive is irrelevant to criminal
liability.80
(3) At the behest of a bank officer, a borrower lied on a
loan application. Charged with "making a false
statement to a federal savings and loan with intent
to influence its actions," the borrower offered
evidence that the persons making the decision, on
the bank's behalf were the ones urging him to make
false statements, and that they seemed determined
to loan him the money. He requested an instruction
requiring proof that he believed the bank would not
have loaned him the money unless he lied. The
court refused, reasoning that the prosecution had no
obligation to prove that he made the false statement
with a deceptive motive, since motive is irrelevant to
criminal liability.181
(4) A father stopped paying court-ordered child support
to his ex-wife when the child was placed in foster
care. Charged with "intentional failure to provide
proper child support, which one reasonably should
know is legally due," the father requested an
instruction requiring proof that he expected his
payments would actually be applied to his child's
support. This was refused on the ground that the
desire to deprive his child of support was a motive
and therefore irrelevant to liability. Knowledge that
180. United States v. Hansen, 701 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1983).
181. United States v. Wilcox, 919 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1990).
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the support payments were court-ordered was all
the "intent" required.
182
(5) A farmer, angered to find a game inspector driving a
truck over his crops, blocked his exit from the field
and called the police. Charged with "obstructing
governmental administration," the defendant
argued that the prosecution had to prove the farmer
believed the game officer had entered the fields
pursuant to his official duties. The court reasoned
that the farmer's purpose of preserving evidence of
what he believed to be the game inspector's
unlawful trespass until the police arrived was
merely a "motive," and therefore irrelevant to
liability. The only "intent" required was to interfere
with a public official while he was in fact working."3
Now in any of these cases, a court might reasonably
grant the defendant's requested instruction or admit the
defendant's proffered evidence, as the appellate court did in
the desertion case above. If a court grants the requested
instruction, it views the hope or expectation of causing the
proscribed harm as part of the mental element or "intent"
required for the offense. But a court might just as
reasonably deny the requested instruction or evidence, as
occurred at trial in desertion case, and in the other four
cases. In so doing, a court simply decides that the hope or
expectation of causing the proscribed harm is not part of
the mental element of the offense.
Courts might base a definition of the mental element
on the text of the statutory provision defining the offense,
or on its legislative history, or on a culpability default
rule,"' or on considerations of morality and prudence. The
182. State v. Meyer, 460 N.W.2d 656 (Neb. 1990).
183. State v. Briggs, 790 A.2d 792 (N.H. 2002).
184. Model Penal Code §§ 2.02(1), 2.02(3), and 2.02(4) (Proposed Official Draft
1962) (culpability default rules). See Guyora Binder, Felony Murder and Mens
Rea Default Rules, 4 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 399, 408-412 (describing Model Penal
Code default rules), 416-430 (describing default rules in 25 state codes).
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New York case of People v. Coe185 illustrates several of these
approaches. Coe was charged with the misdemeanor of
"willful" violation of a regulation proscribing the physical
abuse or mistreatment of a nursing home resident. The
New York Court of Appeals was offered three different
constructions of the mental element of this statute. The
prosecution contended that defendant was guilty as long as
he intentionally struck, shoved or inappropriately
restrained the victim. The Appellate Division contended
that the prosecution must also prove defendant's
knowledge that such treatment was illegal. Finally, the
defense contended that the prosecution must prove, in
addition to these other mental states, defendant's "evil
motive or intent to injure."186 The Court of Appeals rejected
the prosecution's construction of the offense definition as
inconsistent with New York's culpability default rules, the
text of related statutory provisions, and considerations of
desert. It rejected the defense construction, not on the
ground that motive is always irrelevant to criminal
liability, but on the ground that proof of intent to injure
commonly triggers felony liability. Such grave culpability
deserved more punishment than this statute imposed.
By contrast, in the five cases summarized above,
courts eschewed all of these familiar strategies of statutory
construction. Instead, each court simply decided that the
hope or expectation of causing the proscribed harm is not a
required culpability element, arguing that such a hope or
expectation is a "motive" rather than an "intent" and is, for
that reason alone, irrelevant to criminal liability.
But is the irrelevance of motive maxim doing any
persuasive work in these decisions? Suppose the court
instead decides that some form of culpability with respect
to the feared harm is required. Perhaps the statute says so
explicitly, or the legislative history suggests the legislature
intended such a mental element, or the level of punishment
prescribed would otherwise be disproportionate to the
185. 71 N.Y.2d 852 (1988).
186. Id.
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required culpability. For whatever reason, the court
requires culpability with respect to the harm. Is the court
likely to add that while an expectation of harm is really
only a motive, motive is always relevant to the criminal
law? Not likely. The court will simply say that intent or
recklessness or negligence with respect to the harm is part
of the mental element of the offense. Only if a court finds a
particular mental state irrelevant will it trouble to
characterize that mental state as a motive. But there is
nothing about any of the mental states in these five cases
that identify them as motives rather than intentions, other
than their purported irrelevance to liability. The
distinction between motive and intent does no work in
these cases. The irrelevance of motive maxim never tells
any court whether a proposed mental element is a relevant
intent or an irrelevant motive. It merely affords courts the
illusion of having an articulated reason for a decision made
on some unstated ground, or on no ground at all.
Courts' contemporary misuse of the irrelevance of
motive maxim in constructing the mental element of
offenses shows the force of the logical critique. Unless the
concepts of motive and intent can be distinguished from
one another as signifying different mental states, the
irrelevance of motive maxim can not offer a determinate
rule of decision. If there is no psychological difference
between motives and intentions, the irrelevance of motive
maxim cannot be empirically true. It can only have the
logical truth of the empty tautology.
B. Hate Crimes in the Courts
Courts have also misused the irrelevance of motive
maxim in the area of hate crimes. Since the late 1980's
several states have passed hate crime legislation. 187 In the
187. See Cal. Penal Code § 422.7 (West 1988 and Supp.1993); Colo. Rev. Stat. §
18-9-121(2) (Supp. 1995); Fla. Stat. § 775.085 (1991); Idaho Code § 18-7902
(Michie 1987); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-7.1 (West Supp. 1996); Iowa Code Ann. §
729A.2 (West 1993); Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law § 470A (Supp. 1993); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 750.147b (West 1991); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.2231(4) (West Supp.
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early 1990's, a number of state supreme courts considered
challenges to the constitutionality of new statutes
enhancing penalties for various crimes if committed
because of ethnic hatred.8 8  These challenges rested
primarily on federal and state free speech clauses, although
in some states they also included arguments that the new
statutes were void for vagueness (a federal due process
claim)8 9 or violated equal protection. 19 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court and Ohio Supreme Court both struck down
their states' penalty enhancement laws as violations of free
speech, with the Ohio Supreme Court avoiding decision on
due process and equal protection claims. Ultimately, the
United States Supreme Court reversed both decisions,
deciding that the First Amendment did not preclude
enhancing the penalty for a crime of violence based on a
bigoted motive.' 91  Yet both the Wisconsin and Ohio
decisions were notable for their reliance on the irrelevance
of motive maxim to bolster an argument that penalty
enhancements for discriminatory motive amount to
unconstitutional punishment of political opinion.
Both courts accepted the argument that hate crime
liability impermissibly punishes thought alone, in violation
1996); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 574.090(1) (Supp. 1993); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-221(1)
(1993); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 207.185 (Supp. 1995); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-3(e) (West
1995); N.Y. Penal Law § 240.31 (McKinney 1989); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14- 401.14(a)
(1993); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14- 3(c) (1993); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-14-04(1-2) (1985);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.12 (Baldwin 1993); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 850 (1991);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.155 (1995); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-19B-1 (Michie Supp.
1996); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1455 (Supp. 1992); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-42.1
(Michie 1992);Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.080 (1996); W. Va. Code § 61-6-21 (1992);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.645 (West 1996).
188. In re M.S., 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355 (Cal. 1995); State v. Stalder, 630 So.2d
1072 (Fla. 1994); State v. McKnight, 511 N.W.2d 389 (Iowa 1994); Ayers v. State,
645 A.2d 22 (Md. 1994); State v. Vanatter, 869 S.W.2d 754 (Mo. 1994); State v.
Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992); State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 1992);
State v. Ladue, 631 A.2d 236 (Vt. 1993); State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217 (Wash.
1993); State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992).
189. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558; Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450; Talley, 858 P.2d 217; In
re M.S., 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355.
190. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450; LaDue, 631 A.2d 236.
191. Wisconsin v. Mitchell 508 U.S. 476 (1993); Ohio v. Wyant, 508 U.S. 969
(1993).
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of the First Amendment. Such an argument confronts two
difficulties. First, the crimes in question were crimes of
violence (assault in Wisconsin, menacing in Ohio, involving
a death threat). Thus, they didn't punish thought alone,
but a combination of action and thought. Second, all
offenses conditioned on culpability criminalize otherwise
innocent action on the basis of mental states. Moreover,
many offenses, like homicide, are graded on the basis of
different culpable states attending the same conduct.
Sentencing laws also often condition the degree of
punishment on mental states. Thus, if conditioning the
level of punishment on thought is unconstitutional, it
would seem that much of the criminal law must be.
The United States Supreme Court ultimately
overturned both decisions on precisely these grounds. The
Court held that the statutes in question criminalized
clearly punishable conduct rather than speech. 192  The
statutes graded that punishable conduct on the basis of the
same kind of discriminatory motive that triggers civil
liability for civil rights violations. 19 The court noted that
sentences are often enhanced on the basis of disfavored
motives.194 The Court conceded that enhancing a sentence
because of defendant's political beliefs would violate the
First Amendment if those beliefs were unrelated to the
crime. But it concluded that the First Amendment permits
enhancing a sentence because of defendant's political
motives for committing a crime. 19' Indeed, as the Court
noted, the Constitution defines political motive as an
element of the crime of treason.96
Both the Ohio and Wisconsin Supreme Courts
anticipated, and attempted to refute, this argument.
Strangely, both courts tried to contest this argument on the
ground of substantive criminal law rather than free speech
law. Surely, the straightforward response to this argument
192. Wisconsin v. Mitchell 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993).
193. 508 U.S. 476, 487.
194. Id. at 485.
195. Id. at 485-486.
196. Id. at 489.
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is to concede that the criminal law can grade penalties on
the basis of mental states, including motives, but to argue
that the First Amendment precludes punishing one
particular kind of motivation, the purpose of expressing a
political ideology. According to this interpretation of the
free speech principle, government is free to punish acts of
violence that express political beliefs, so long as it does not
condition the amount of punishment on the expression of
political beliefs as such.
Yet both courts eschewed this narrow critique of hate-
based penalty enhancements. Instead, both courts
responded with the sweeping claim that the criminal law
does not, and can not condition punishment on motive at
all. This argument was developed by defense attorney
Susan Gellman, who presented it to the Ohio Supreme
Court and explained it in an article that influenced the
Wisconsin court.19 The gist of this argument is that all
culpable mental states actually used as criteria of liability
or sentencing enhancements are intentions rather than
motives, so that hate crime statutes uniquely punish
offenders for their motives. Unfortunately, none of the
proponents of this argument explain the supposed link
between the irrelevance of motive maxim and the
Constitution. Is the irrelevance of motive required by due
process? If so, why do the Ohio and Wisconsin courts rely
on it in ruling that hate crime statutes violate the First
Amendment? Is it, then, that the First Amendment forbids
the punishment of any motive, even a nonpolitical one?
Gellman apparently thinks that "the First Amendment
does not ... permit criminalization of pure motive."19 Is it
that the First Amendment permits punishing violence
committed with the "intention," but not the "motive," of
expressing a political view? But why? And how can we tell
197. Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words
Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation
Laws, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 333 (1991).
198. Id. at 368 (Gellman considers whether bigotry might be excepted from this
general rule under the "fighting words" doctrine.).
20021
74 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
that the purpose of expressing group hate is a "motive"
rather than an "intent"?
In any case, the argument that hate crimes uniquely
punish motive rather than intent depends on the
irrelevance of motive maxim being a descriptively true
empirical claim. If it is tautologically true that motive is
irrelevant to criminal liability, then hate crime statutes
cannot criminalize motive by definition. Yet, citing LaFave
and Scott, and Gellman, the Ohio and Wisconsin Supreme
Courts offered the self-defeating argument that motive was
irrelevant to criminal liability by definition.
According to the Ohio Supreme Court,
Motive, in criminal law, is not an element of the crime.
In their textbook, 1 Substantive Criminal Law (1986) 318,
Section 3.6, LaFave and Scott argue that if defined narrowly
enough, motive is not relevant to substantive criminal
law .... Other thought-related concepts such as intent and
purpose are used in the criminal law as elements of crimes or
penalty-enhancing criteria, but motive itself is not
punished.... 'While motive may be relevant as a mitigating
factor in the penalty phase, it is irrelevant to the guilt-phase
determination... '; Gellman, ... 39 UCLA L. Rev. 333.
There is a significant difference between why a person
commits a crime and whether a person has intentionally
done the acts which are made criminal. Motive is the
reasons and beliefs that lead a person to act or refrain from
acting. The same crime can be committed for any number of
different motives. Enhancing a penalty because of motive
therefore punishes the person's thought, rather than the
person's act or criminal intent.199
The Wisconsin Court reasoned similarly, quoting
Gellman's analysis of a burglary hypothetical discussed by
LaFave and Scott:
Because all of the crimes under chs. 939 to 948, Stats., are
already punishable, all that remains is an additional
punishment for the defendant's motive in selecting the
199. State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d at 453-54 (citations omitted).
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victim. The punishment of the defendant's bigoted motive
by the hate crimes statute directly implicates and
encroaches upon First Amendment rights.
... Merely because the statute refers in a literal sense
to the intentional 'conduct' of selecting, does not mean the
court must turn a blind eye to the intent and practical effect
of the law-punishment of offensive motive or thought .....
In this case the crime was aggravated battery, and the
necessary intent under sec. 940.19(lm), Stats. is an 'intent
to cause great bodily harm.' Quite clearly, Mitchell's intent
to cause great bodily harm to Reddick is distinct from his
motive or reason for doing so. Criminal law is not concerned
with a person's reasons for committing crimes, but rather
with the actor's intent or purpose in doing so.
As explained by Professor Gellman:
Unlike purpose or intent, motive cannot be a criminal
offense or an element of an offense....
The distinction becomes more clear upon
consideration of the effect of altering the intent or
purpose on the legal characterization of the same
conduct, as compared to the effect.., of altering the
motive. Continuing with the example of burglary,
changing the purpose of the break-in changes the very
nature of the act: If A broke into B's house for the
purpose of getting A's own property... the act of breaking
in is ... not burglary, even if A's motive was identical
(the desire to pay his debts). By contrast, changing A's
motives, even to more sympathetic ones (say, the desire to
buy a house for the homeless), while his purpose was that
of committing the crime of theft in B's house, does not
change the nature of the act: it is still burglary. °°
A check of LaFave and Scott's text shows that
Gellman's gloss is unreliable and that both courts have
misapplied LaFave and Scott's statements to hate crime
statutes. According to Gellman, "Professor LaFave points
out that, unlike intent, 'motive is not relevant on the
substantive side of the criminal law.' 20 1 But LaFave and
200. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 812-13 & 813 n.11 (citing Gellman, supra
note 197, at 364-65).
201. Gellman, supra note 197, at 364 (quoting LaFave & Scott, supra note 32, §
2002]
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Scott's actual statement is that "[m]otive, if narrowly
defined to exclude recognized defenses and the 'specific
intent' requirements of some crimes, is not relevant." 202
Thus Gellman suppresses the fact LaFave simply
stipulated that motive means whatever purposes are not
elements of offenses or defenses, while acknowledging that
these elements include mental states that would otherwise
be called motives.
LaFave and Scott illustrated their distinction with an
offender breaking into a home to steal money to pay his
debts. They urged that the purpose to get money should be
characterized as an intent because it is an offense element,
while the purpose to repay a debt should be characterized
as a motive because it is not an offense element. Based on
LaFave and Scott's example, Gellman defines intent as
"the actor's mental state as it determines culpability based
on volition," purpose as "what the actor plans as a result of
the conduct," and motive as "the actor's underlying,
propelling reasons for acting. 2 °3 As the Wisconsin court
notes, Gellman argues that changing the actor's "motive"
for the break-in does not change its character as burglary,
whereas changing the actor's purpose does. But both the
desire for money and the desire to repay debts are purposes
in Gellman's terms, and the first is an intention in LaFave
and Scott's terms only because it is defined as an element
of liability. According to LaFave and Scott's terminology, if
group hate is defined as an offense element, it becomes an
intention. Indeed, in the most recent edition of the
treatise, LaFave draws a direct parallel between the intent
to steal in burglary, and group animus in hate crimes. He
treats them both as specific intent requirements, and
concludes "it is preferable to view such crimes as not being
based on proof of a bad motive. "204
By adopting LaFave's definition of motive-any
purpose that does not change an act's character as an
3.6 at 227).
202. LaFave & Scott, supra note 32, § 3.6 at 227 (emphasis added).
203. Gellman, supra note 197, at 364
204. LaFave, supra note 151, at 242.
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offense-the Ohio and Wisconsin Supreme Courts made the
irrelevance of motive maxim always true by definition.
Nevertheless, the Ohio court also tried to show that the
irrelevance of motive maxim was an empirically true
description of criminal law, by denying that any purpose
bearing on liability was properly called a motive. For
example, the court denied that the purpose to commit a
theft required for one form of burglary was a motive, saying
that "[w]hat is being punished is... the additional act of
theft, or the intent to commit theft .... The object of the
purpose is itself a crime. Thus the penalty is not enhanced
solely to punish the thought or motive."205  The Court
distinguishes here between a purpose to commit some
additional offense and a purpose which, if achieved, would
not be an additional offense. It implies that only the
purpose to commit some additional criminal offense can
aggravate liability constitutionally.
But the Constitution cannot possibly restrict
aggravating purposes to results which would constitute
additional crimes. Consider the following hypothetical
statutory scheme:
Section 146.01 Criminal Misappropriation in the
Second Degree. A person is guilty of criminal
misappropriation in the second degree if he knowingly
takes property without the owner's consent. Criminal
Misappropriation in the Second Degree is a class C
misdemeanor.
Section 146.02 Criminal Misappropriation in the
First Degree. A person is guilty of criminal
misappropriation in the first degree if he knowingly
takes property without the owner's consent for the
purpose of causing the owner inconvenience. Criminal
Misappropriation in the First Degree is a class B
misdemeanor.
Section 146.03 Theft. A person is guilty of theft if he
knowingly takes property without the owner's consent
205. State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d at 455.
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for the purpose of keeping it or otherwise permanently
depriving the owner of it. Theft is a class A
misdemeanor.
This statutory scheme aggravates the offense of knowingly
taking the property of another based on the purposes of
inconveniencing or permanently expropriating the owner.
Yet this scheme includes no additional offenses that
require actually inconveniencing or expropriating the
owner. Thus it is not true of this example that "the object
of the [aggravating] purpose is itself a crime." According to
the Ohio Supreme Court's terminology, then, these
aggravating purposes are motives. Can the court seriously
contend that the above scheme violates some constitutional
standard? Of what? Free speech? Due Process? The
Court's argument has the dubious implication that a
jurisdiction is constitutionally required to punish a result
every time it enhances punishment because of a purpose to
cause that result.
The Court makes a similarly fallacious argument
concerning aggravating conditions for murder. The Court
argues that murder for hire "is not properly seen as
enhancing the penalty for a mercenary motive. .. The
greater punishment is for the additional act of hiring or
being hired to kill."2 °6 That may be true as a matter of Ohio
law, but it is hard to see why Ohio should be
constitutionally precluded from aggravating greed-
motivated killings. Would this infringe freedom of
thought? Arguing in the same spirit, Gellman implies that
legislatures could not constitutionally aggravate murders
committed for the purpose of killing a police officer or for
the purpose of furthering another felony. She argues that
such penalty enhancements can only be for the
circumstances that a victim is an officer," 7 or that a
206. Id.
207. Gellman, supra note 197, at 365. Note that in New York, this aggravator
is conditioned on reason to know that the victim is a police officer. N.Y. Penal
Law § 125.27(1)(a)(i) (McKinney 2002).
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murder coincides with a felony. 208 But of course legislators
can and do grade offenses involving similar conduct and
consequences on the basis of "thoughts alone." It is
possible to stipulate that all inculpatory thoughts and
purposes are intentions rather than motives, but this
strategy will automatically reclassify group hate as an
intent as soon as its gratification or expression becomes an
aggravating purpose. It appears difficult to both assert the
irrelevance of motive maxim as a statement of positive law,
and also use it as a critical principle, as the Ohio and
Wisconsin courts sought to do. Any effort to apply the
irrelevance of motive maxim to the hate-crimes controversy
stumbles over the logical and descriptive objections
explored above.
C. Confining Motive to Defenses or Sentencing
Let us now consider some efforts to define and apply a
more limited irrelevance of motive maxim. Several
scholars have argued that while motive has a proper place
in the definition of defenses, and at the sentencing stage, it
should be excluded from the definition of offenses. Having
conceded the normative relevance of desiderative states to
blame and punishment, these authors now face a dilemma.
They must either explain why desiderative states although
relevant to desert, should be excluded from offense
definitions; or they must distinguish "motives" from other
desiderative states, without merely excluding them from
offense definitions, by definition.
Jerome Hall was an early and influential exponent of
the view that motive should be confined to sentencing.
Recall that Hall defined mens rea as the intentional or
reckless creation of harm or risk, and defined motive as
one's reasons for doing so. Hall recognized motive as a
component of blameworthiness, but insisted that
consideration of motive should be limited to sentencing, so
208. Gellman, supra note 197, at 365. New York conditions this aggravator on
the killing being in furtherance of the felony. N.Y. Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(vii)
(McKinney 2002).
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as to advance the value of legality. In accepting the moral
relevance of motive, Hall anticipated and acquiesced in the
normative objection to the exclusion of motive from offense
definition. Hall was also aware of the logical and
descriptive objections offered by Salmond, Hitchler, and
Cook.109 Nevertheless, Hall replied that these critics were
beset with conceptual confusions and he insisted that
motive should remain irrelevant to criminal liability.
Unfortunately, Hall's emphatic restatement of the
irrelevance of motive maxim left unanswered a number of
important questions posed by the descriptive, logical, and
normative objections. One was the nature of intent. Did
Hall consider criminal intent a purely cognitive state of
expecting harm? Or did he include within criminal intent a
desiderative aspect, a desire for or willingness to inflict
harm? Was there a difference between knowingly imposing
risk and purposely imposing risk? If intent had a
desiderative dimension, the concepts of intent and motive
might overlap after all.
This possibility raises a question about the scope of
motive. What if an actor's reason for intentionally
inflicting harm was the desire to inflict harm? Could a
criminal intent also be a motive, or would Hall have
defined the category of motive to exclude the mental
element of offenses automatically? Unless Hall was willing
to exclude desire from intention or exclude inculpatory
desire from motive, the two concepts would indeed overlap,
and some motives would be pertinent to criminal liability.
If criminal intent does include any desire to harm, we
face a third question: what if an actor's reason for inflicting
a harm or imposing a risk was the desire to inflict some
other harm? Could the motive for one offense be the intent
to commit another? Could that secondary intention
aggravate the defendant's culpability? If so, this would
provide a second way that criminal liability would depend
on motive.
209. Hall, supra note 1, at 150-51.
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Finally, Hall's argument that motives should be
considered at sentencing rather than trial raises some
questions. First, why did Hall assume that bad motives
would be any harder to define and grade than bad
intentions? Presumably intentions can be graded on the
basis of their anticipated harms: a certainty of death is
worse than a probability of injury. But cannot some
motives be graded in the same way? A desire to kill is
worse than a desire to injure. A desire to inflict great pain
is worse than a desire to annoy. A desire for undeserved
riches is worse than a desire to fulfill an obligation to
provide necessities to a child.
Even presuming Hall was right that motives cannot be
categorized and graded, but must be evaluated on a case-
by-case basis, why must that case-by-case evaluation occur
at sentencing rather than trial? We usually think of the
trial as the forum in which to assess the unjustified harm
or risk the defendant created, and the culpability with
which he did so. These are features of the defendant's
conduct, not his character. They determine the
wrongfulness of his conduct as defined by conduct norms
prescribed and publicized in advance. The trial is also the
place to consider at least those exculpatory circumstances
or incapacitating conditions that completely eliminate
blameworthiness, because no blameless person should be
pronounced guilty. On this view, a sentencing hearing is
an appropriate place to consider any features of the
defendant's character relevant to the amount or form of
punishment he merits, from the standpoint of desert or
utility, that do not exculpate him completely. In other
words, sentencing is not case-by-case decision-making
because it is not about "the case." Legality requires that
the extent of defendant's culpable wrongdoing be
determined at trial, not at sentencing. Sentencing is
person-by-person decision-making. It is a choice among the
range of punishments appropriate to the wrongfulness of
defendant's conduct, based on any individual
characteristics. So if, as Hall seemed to think, motives are
determinants of the wrongfulness of defendant's conduct,
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rather than permanent features of his character, they
should be judged at trial according to norms of conduct
promulgated and publicized in advance.
If those norms cannot be defined very precisely, their
application will require discretion. But Hall did not
identify any reason why that discretion is better exercised
by a judge at a sentencing hearing than by a jury at a trial.
The law often requires criminal juries to apply very flexible
standards. According to the Model Penal Code, judgments
of recklessness depend on an assessment as to whether a
consciously disregarded risk is "substantial and
unjustifiable" and on whether "its disregard involves a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-
abiding person would observe in the actor's situation" in
light of "the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct."21°
When a duress defense is offered, juries may have to decide
whether the threat is one a "person of reasonable firmness"
would have been able to resist.21 ' Criminal statutes frame
many issues by reference to such vague "reasonableness"
standards.212 Of course one implication of these examples is
that juries routinely do evaluate defendant's motives in
resolving both offense and defense issues. But another
implication is that we currently expect juries to exercise
discretion and moral judgment in determining guilt.
Martin Gardner has offered a detailed argument for a
position similar to Hall's.213  Gardner sees motive as
relevant to defenses and sentencing, but not to offense
definition. Gardner reasons that considerations of legality
caused the criminal law to abandon the archaic "evil
motive" conception of culpability in favor of specific states
of mind peculiar to different offenses. But as long as
vestiges of the "evil motive" approach remain within
offense definitions, they undermine the determinacy and
210. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
211. Id. at § 2.09(1).
212. Oren Zeve, Justification of Belief Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 147-91
(1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, S.U.N.Y. at Buffalo) (on file with the
author).
213. Gardner, supra note 5, at 685-86, 694.
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predictability of the criminal law, and expose defendants to
the risk of being punished prejudicially for their opinions
and general character, rather than their acts.
Individualized consideration of defendants'
blameworthiness is appropriate in deciding whether to
justify, excuse, or mitigate their offenses, but offenses must
be defined in general descriptive terminology.
Unfortunately, the indeterminacy of the distinction
between motive and intent, and the futility of any
aspiration to eliminate moral criteria from offense
definitions undermine Gardner's argument. While
Gardner objects to a number of doctrines as vestiges of the
supposedly ancient "evil motive" approach, he cannot
distinguish them on any principled basis from the doctrines
he approves. Gardner objects to five doctrines: the
conditioning of some sex and family offenses (notably
bigamy, adultery, and statutory rape) on partial strict
liability; the felony murder and misdemeanor
manslaughter doctrines; the "transfer" of culpability from
intended to similar unintended results; the conditioning of
property damage offenses on spite or hostility; and hate
crime liability. Gardner considers each of these an
instance of punishing a defendant for desiring a bad
consequence other than the one she is charged with
causing. But Gardner fails to acknowledge how pervasive
and necessary this form of culpability is in the criminal
law.
Critics have long objected to punishing adultery and
bigamy without proof of at least negligence with respect to
the risk that one of the partners remains legally married to
another living partner. They have also objected to
punishing sex acts with minors without proof of at least
negligence with respect to the victim's age. According to
Gardner, both of these types of offenses are based on the
archaic theory that anyone engaged in sex acts risks
liability for trafficking with an illegal partner. This theory
illegitimately substitutes the supposed immorality of sex
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(or divorce, in some bigamy and adultery cases) for the
actual intent to do harm.214
But is Gardner objecting to the general principle of
punishing badly motivated harmful conduct, or is he just
objecting that the motives being punished here, sex and
divorce, are not really bad? If the latter, the imposition of
strict liability for adultery and bigamy are misapplications
of an otherwise valid principle of punishing bad motive.
Does Gardner object to punishing child-molesters who
reasonably believe their nine-year-old victims are ten, as
severely as those who know who their victims are nine?
215
If not, he accepts the principle of punishing on the basis of
motive rather than expectation.
Notice too, how malleable the motive is irrelevant
argument can be. The argument that bigamists and
adulterers should not be punished unless they desire or
expect the harm they are charged with causing is the same
one offered above by defendants accused of desertion, bank
fraud, neglect of child support, and obstruction of
governmental administration. In the statutory
construction cases considered above, prosecutors argued
that accepting this argument would require them to prove
bad motive rather than merely illegal intent. That the
immoral motive/illegal intent distinction can be marshalled
on both sides of these arguments is not surprising. After
all, motives are desires, indistinguishable from intentions
except by reference to whether they are relevant to
liability, and the immorality of a desire is one reason for
making it relevant to liability.
Gardner reasons that it made sense to transfer
culpability from a felony to an unintended resulting death,
when all felonies were punished with equal severity. But
he argues that now that felonies are punished less than
murder, the felony murder rule results in excessive
punishment, "perhaps death"216 for unintended, unforeseen,
214. Id. at 698-704.
215. See, e.g. Model Penal Code § 213.6(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
216. Id. at 707.
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and even nonnegligent killings.217 Gardner's argument
depends upon a distortion of the original implications of the
felony murder rule. When early forms of the felony murder
rule were proposed in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, felonies other than murder were eligible for
benefit of clergy (which exposed literate offenders to only
minor penalties) and attempted felonies were usually not
punishable at all. Thus, absent a special rule for illegal act
homicide, one who caused death in attempting a violent
and dangerous offense might receive no punishment at all.
The felony murder rule was an early form of attempt
liability, punishing at least those attempts resulting in the
most serious harm. This connection between the felony
murder rule and attempt liability reminds us that attempts
also exemplify the principle Gardner attacks: punishment
for an unfulfilled wish to cause a particular harm. Yet
Gardner raises no objection to attempt liability.
More troubling is the fact that Gardner's argument
against the felony murder rule relies on a distorted picture
of its contemporary application. The death penalty can
only be applied to felony murders that are either
intentional or that express depraved indifference to human
life.218 In some jurisdictions, felony murder is predicated on
recklessness or negligence. 19 In most jurisdictions, felony
murder is predicated on a small number of enumerated,
inherently dangerous felonies. Arguably, any person
committing such a felony should be aware of a substantial
risk of death. Some jurisdictions limit felony murders to
those caused proximately (that is, foreseeably) or in
furtherance of the felony, and some provide an affirmative
defense for unarmed, unwitting accomplices to a felony
murder. The effect of these various limits on the felony
murder rule is to restrict it, in most jurisdictions, to
negligent killings in the pursuit of very serious crimes.
Gardner's exaggeration of the risk that felony
murderers will be punished excessively again raises a
217. Id. at 706.
218. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
219. See Binder, supra note 184, at 430-37.
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question about the true target of his argument. Is he
objecting to the principle that liability for harm should be
enhanced on the basis of an offender's desire to commit a
serious crime? Or is he merely objecting to its intemperate
application? Should we abolish the felony murder rule
altogether, or merely keep it within its traditional limits?
Gardner does not seem to mind other applications of the
principle that a criminal purpose should aggravate
liability. Thus, he raises no objection to aggravating
intentional killings to capital murder when committed in
furtherance of a felony, or aggravating reckless
manslaughter to extreme indifference murder, when risk is
recklessly imposed for a base, antisocial purpose.
20
Gardner's critique of transferred intent is similarly
inconsistent. He explains that this doctrine seemed
necessary when there was no attempt liability,221 but now
one who kills "B" unintentionally in a failed attempt to
murder "A" can be prosecuted for the attempt on "A" and
for killing "B" recklessly. But both of the doctrines that
Gardner would substitute for transferred intent would
seem to punish motive as well. We have already observed
that attempt liability punishes on the basis of harm
defendant wishes to cause, not harm she causes. As for
recklessness, recklessness involves imposing a significant
and unjustifiable risk of death.22 Thus, it is impossible to
identify recklessness without a moral evaluation of the
purposes for which defendant imposed a risk of death.
Gardner admits the dependence of recklessness on the
relative immorality of the actor's purposes,223 but he does
not see how this admission undercuts his claim that the
availability of liability for recklessness obviates the need to
transfer intent. He is not substituting intent for motive, or
descriptive terminology for normative terminology. He is
220. See, e.g., People v. Protopappas, 246 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1988); Pillsbury,
supra note 163, at 172-84.
221. Gardner, supra note 5, at 709-10.
222. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
223. Gardner, supra note 5, at 725-27.
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substituting one moral evaluation of defendant's purposes
for another.
Despite Gardner's objections to transferred culpability,
it cannot be avoided. It is impossible to ascribe an event to
a culpable choice without abstracting away some of the
particularities of the event and treating it as a token of a
type.
Consider the following examples of accidental
byproducts of intentional wrongdoing: An assassin aims at
his victim's head but inadvertently hits his victim's heart.
Or misses the victim's body but hits her car's tire, causing a
fatal collision. A terrorist unsuccessfully attempts to
destroy a building with the force of a collision and
unexpectedly destroys a different building by fire. In
attempting to force her child's head under water, an
abusive parent breaks the child's neck. A driver forces
another driver's car off the road, unexpectedly (but
unsurprisingly) causing it to hit a pedestrian. In all these
cases, it seems plausible to hold the perpetrator as
responsible for the result she actually caused as for the
result she "had in mind."
Alternatively, for each of these cases, we can imagine a
different offender with a less precise, but equally
malevolent intent. The assassin aims a shotgun at his
victim, or blows up his victim's car, and so is uncertain
exactly what fatal injuries she will inflict. The terrorist
sets off an explosion, hoping to destroy buildings. The
driver deliberately drives into a crowd, not knowing whom
he might injure. The abusive parent intends to endanger
the child's life. In all these cases, the offender does not
even have a specific event in mind. Yet it would be odd to
punish these offenders more than their counterparts
because their intention to harm was less precisely
formulated or vividly imagined. These examples suggest
that we are interested in the intent to cause or risk a
certain class of harms rather than a specific event.
This is easiest to see with negligence and recklessness.
We usually consider an act reckless if the actor is aware
(and criminally negligent if she should be aware) that all
2002]
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the expected costs of her conduct to others greatly outweigh
all the expected benefits. 24 Thus, a judgment of negligence
or recklessness requires that we calculate and aggregate
the probabilities of a host of different harms and benefits.
When a defendant deliberately fires one shot into a dense
crowd of a thousand, the chances of any particular person
in the crowd being killed are quite small, but the overall
risk of death is substantial and unjustifiable. A drug
wholesaler dilutes a prescribed cancer drug with a powder
that can cause potentially fatal allergic reactions in some
patients. The risk to any one patient may be small: few
patients are allergic, many would have died of cancer
anyway, others will get better on their own. But the
recklessness of the act depends on aggregating the risk of
preventable deaths from cancer and the risk of fatal
allergic reaction over a population of many patients.
Because judgments of recklessness and negligence require
assessments of risk, the Model Penal Code determines
whether an actor has recklessly or negligently caused harm
by asking whether that harm was within the scope of the
risk recklessly or negligently inflicted.225 Ascribing a
harmful result to an actor's recklessness or negligence
therefore involves determining whether it is part of a set of
morally equivalent hypothetical consequences.
But as illustrated by the example of the assassin who
aims at one vital organ and hits another, even intentions
can be fulfilled by more than one scenario. Accordingly, the
Model Penal Code assesses intentional causation by
reference to classes of morally equivalent events. It asks
whether a harm was within the scope of the actor's intent,
or was similar except for the identity of the person or
property harmed, or the gravity of the harm, or was similar
and "not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a
Ijust] bearing on the actor's liability .... ,226
The drafters of the Model Penal Code understood that
the attribution of culpability, whether for imposing risk or
224. Model Penal Code §§ 2.02(2)(c) & (d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
225. Id. at § 2.03(3).
226. Id. at § 2.03(2) (bracketing of "just" in original).
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for inflicting harm, involves imagining a class of
hypothetical harms for which the actor would be
responsible. When we consider an actor's culpability for
causing a result, the question is never "Did the actor
precisely predict the consequences of his action?" The
question is "Can we fairly ascribe the injustice of those
consequences to his choice?" Strictly speaking, an actor
never causes harm, but merely supplies one among an
infinity of causal conditions.227  Causal responsibility
depends on a judgment that an actor deserves to be treated
as if his decisions caused the specific result because his act
showed some degree of willingness to wrong another
person. Causation and culpability are metaphors.
Gardner's objection to transferred intent reflects a quixotic
aspiration to base criminal liability on a completely precise
and value neutral description of states of affairs. He
ascribes such an aspiration to the drafters of the Model
Penal Code, but their embrace of transferred intent shows
the futility of that aspiration.
Gardner's objections to conditioning liability on
personal hostility28 and group hate229 are much of a piece.
In his eyes, both of these mental elements are too hard for
prosecutors to prove and place too much discretion in the
hands of fact-finders, who may use it to punish unpopular
opinions or life-styles. Yet, these objections seem
speculative and contradictory. Why is it any harder to
prove motives of personal or group hate than to prove the
intentions to annoy or frighten commonly found in
definitions of assault and harassment? Part of the harm of
hate crimes consists in the message of intimidation and
degradation they publicly communicate to a class of
victims. Where that message is clearly legible, the intent
behind it will be easy to prove. Where that message is not
clearly legible, group animus will be difficult to prove, but
there will be little purpose served in charging a hate crime.
227. Richard Taylor, Causation, in 2 Encyclopedia of Philosophy 56, 63 (Paul
Edwards ed., 1967).
228. Gardner, supra note 5, at 713-17.
229. Id. at 717-24.
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In any case, it is hard to see why the difficulty of proving
group animus gives jurors discretion to punish on some
other, less legitimate basis.
Of course, hate crime statutes can be drafted badly so
as not to clearly require group animus. Statutes that
enhance penalties for "selecting" a victim because of group
membership are inadvisable because in a diverse society in
which group membership correlates with other
demographic variables, an offender might screen victims on
the basis of group membership without expressing any
group animus. Thus, a mugger working a black
neighborhood might select white victims believing they are
more likely to carry a lot of money, less likely to resist
effectively, less likely to elicit sympathy from passers by,
less likely to recognize or identify their assailant, and less
likely to avenge the attack. Hate crime statutes should not
be used simply to punish opportunistic cross-racial crimes,
because that would offend the principle of equal protection
of laws.2 30  Hate crime statutes should therefore require
group animus, or perhaps intent to degrade or intimidate
because of group membership. The drawbacks of a vaguely
drafted hate crime statute are drawbacks of vagueness, not
of hate crime liability.
Gardner never argues that those who commit crimes in
order to express bigotry do not deserve more punishment.231
Instead, he offers two alternatives to conditioning
aggravated liability on bigoted motive. Yet his two
alternatives seem far worse from the standpoint of legality.
One is a proposal to enhance liability for committing crimes
against certain demographic groups, an explicit rejection of
the principle of equal protection of the laws.23 2 As a variant
of this proposal, Gardner suggests permitting an
230. See Allison Marston Danner, Bias Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity:
Culpability in Context, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 389, 422-23 (2002) (distinguishing
between biased and merely opportunistic selection on the basis of group
membership).
231. Id. at 748.
232. For the reasons expressed in the text, I object to penalty enhancements for




affirmative defense, shifting the burden of proof onto the
defendant to disprove racial animus."' Why he thinks
burden shifting would enhance legality or decrease the risk
to unpopular defendants is a mystery. His other proposal
is to move the assessment of motive to sentencing, so that
it need not be announced to the public as an offense
element, charged in an indictment, supported with
evidence at a pretrial hearing, or proven beyond a
reasonable doubt at a jury trial.234 Gardner concedes the
principle that some motives are indeed relevant to
blameworthiness and should increase punishment. 235 If so,
the best way to reconcile this principle with Gardner's
stated concern for legality is to define, charge, and prove
such motives as offense elements.
Jeremy Horder has taken a similar position:
aggravating motives should be considered at sentencing,
not in identifying offenses.236 But his adherence to this
position seems undermotivated, as if the irrelevance of
motive maxim were maintaining its inertia after it had
ceased to exert any persuasive force. For Horder, grading
offenses on the basis of aggravating motives is "needless
over-elaboration in a criminal statute, questions of
heinousness being better left to sentencing."237  Like
Gardner, Horder is not objecting to the principle that the
culpability of an act depends on the moral worth of the
reasons for doing it. Quite the contrary.238 Horder explains
his position as follows:
The existence of a crime, justifiably created, reflects a
reason not to do the thing prohibited. An 'aggravating'
motive for committing a crime is regarded as aggravating
because it provided yet another reason not to do the thing
prohibited, a reason on which the defendant culpably acted,
233. Id. at 722-24.
234. Id. at 748.
235. Id.
236. Jeremy Horder, On the Irrelevance of Motive in Criminal Law, in Oxford
Essays in Jurisprudence 173, 176-77 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000).
237. Id. at 176.
238. Id. at 173.
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to be added to the reasons on which the law is based....
But if the reason not to [commit the crime] ... on which the
law is based is, ex hypothesi, sufficient to justify
criminalization, there may be scant justification for giving a
legal basis to yet further reasons to act in this way. 9
"Scant justification"? The justification is that (1) the act is
more punishable if committed with greater culpability, and
(2) fairness, deterrence, and democracy require that
circumstances warranting greater punishment be specified
publicly, prospectively, and legislatively, and (3) the
presumption of innocence requires that such circumstances
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Horder offers
nothing to counter these conventional reasons for defining
inculpatory circumstances as offense elements. In
accepting the normative objection that motive is relevant to
blameworthiness, Gardner and Horder cut the legs from
under their own versions of the motive is irrelevant maxim.
Perhaps the most attenuated version of the motive is
irrelevant maxim is offered by Antony Duff. 240 Duff
acknowledges the force of the descriptive objection:
[0] n any plausible interpretation of the concept of 'motive,'
motives are ... relevant to criminal liability. Thus, to offer
just three examples, if my motive for picking up a dropped
wallet is to return it to its owner, my action is not a theft; if
it is to keep the wallet, my action is theft. If my motive for
damaging another's property is to protect my own property,
I might avoid a conviction for criminal damage.... If my
motive for carrying what counts in law as an offensive
weapon is to defend myself against a threatened, imminent
attack, I might avoid conviction for carrying an offensive
weapon; but if my motive for carrying an otherwise innocent
article is to use it to commit an assault, I am guilty of that
offence.24'
239. Id. at 174.
240. Antony Duff, Principle and Contradictions in the Criminal Law: Motives
and Criminal Liability, in Philosophy and the Criminal Law: Principle and
Critique 156 (Antony Duff ed., 1998).
241. Id. at 173.
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Duff considers defining motive as only those
"motivating factors" that are "irrelevant to criminal
liability,"242 but acknowledges the logical objection that
such a definition reduces the motive is irrelevant maxim to
an empty tautology.24a Nevertheless, in the face of these
descriptive and logical objectives, Duff attempts to rescue
the motive is irrelevant maxim by making it "a definitional
truth about the task of adjudication."24 Thus, "[tlo avoid
the appearance of triviality, we might better express the
doctrine as holding not that 'motive' is irrelevant to
criminal liability, but that 'further motive' is irrelevant to
liability; and as a doctrine that applies to courts, not
legislatures. "245 Duff agrees that legislatures can and
should "so define particular crimes that the agent's motives
are relevant to whether or for what he is to be criminally
liable.2 46 In so doing, like Hall, Gardner and Horder, Duff
seems to accept the normative relevance of motive to
criminal liability. Duff sees no problem with a legislature
mitigating homicide on the basis of the humanitarian
motive of ending the suffering of a consenting terminally ill
patient, or aggravating it on the basis of group hate. But
Once the legislature has defined crimes, it is for the courts
to apply those definitions...; and in so doing they should
attend only to the issue of whether the defendant's actions
matched the law's definition of a crime. They will thus
often have to attend to questions of what motivated the
defendant because such motivational questions will often be
relevant to her liability: but they must not attend to
motivational factors that are not declared relevant by the
law.
247
This division of labor is sensible enough, but has nothing to
do with motives as such: courts will also attend only to
242. Id.
243. Id. at 174.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 177.
246. Id. at 177.
247. Id. at 174.
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those intentions legislatively defined as offense or defense
elements. Duff has replaced the maxim that motive is
irrelevant to liability with the quite different maxim that
legislatures alone should define offense elements and
defenses. Having accepted the descriptive, logical, and
normative objections to the irrelevance of motive maxim, he
has essentially abandoned it.
But in so doing, he has maintained faith with one of
the original purposes of the motive is irrelevant maxim. In
its day, the maxim crudely and confusingly expressed the
idea that liability for every crime should require proof of
some specific mental state, defined in advance, probably by
a legislature. That idea has triumphed, but implies
nothing about whether those mental states should be
cognitive or desiderative, or whether they should be
represented in neutral and descriptive or in normative
terminology. Although the irrelevance of motive maxim
was historically associated with the emergent idea of
legality in criminal law, the association was arbitrary. The
idea of legality really has nothing to do with any defensible
conception of motive.
CONCLUSION
The distinction between motive and intent in criminal
law emerged in the nineteenth century as a result of two
related responses to a great expansion of legislative
activity. This growth of legislative activity forced an
intellectual revolution within criminal law. The exclusive
function of maintaining public peace, which had theretofore
confined the criminal law within narrow limits, was
expanded to embrace service to any public interest.
Lawyers and reformers sought for new limitations to
discipline legislatures and courts and to prevent arbitrary
and unnecessary punishment.
Within criminal law doctrine, this effort expressed
itself in the project of analyzing liability into act and
mental elements and using these as the building blocks of
offense definition. This project yielded a newly technical
[Vol. 6:1
MOTIVE AND INTENT
terminology of intention. Thus, the idea that criminal
liability always depended on intent was a premise of this
project of offense definition. In legal and political theory,
the effort to discipline legislatures and courts took the form
of a utilitarian science of legislation. Exponents of this
science sought to define the public interest, to allocate
exclusive responsibility for its definition and pursuit to the
legislature, and to determine the most effective legislative
means for its pursuit. Utilitarianism sought to found
policy on a mechanics of human desire. Accordingly,
utilitarianism sharply distinguished motivations, which
were inherently fixed, from behavior, which legislators
could manipulate by means of legal sanctions. The idea
that motives should not be penalized was a premise of
utilitarianism.
Thus the terms "intention" and "motivation" emerged
out of two distinct discourses and collided. These two
discourses had compatible aims, but quite disparate
premises. To legal scientists, "intention" meant the
authoritatively defined mental element of an offense. When
contrasted with intention in this sense, motivation could
only mean mental states that were not inculpatory. To
utilitarians, "motivation" meant desiderative mental states.
When contrasted with motivation in this sense, intention
could only mean cognitive mental states. Thus both groups
could agree that motive was irrelevant to criminal liability,
but meant completely different things by this claim.
Since "motive," as defined by utilitarians, and "intent,"
as used in doctrinal analysis, were not mutually exclusive
terms, the intent-not-motive formula was beset with logical
difficulties. It proved impossible to distinguish motive from
intent in a way that made the motive is irrelevant thesis
both true and non-trivial. Many legal decision makers
thought that purposes and desires were morally significant
and so conditioned liability on these desiderative states. As
a result, the utilitarian version of the motive is irrelevant
claim has never been descriptively true. On the other
hand, because the mental elements of criminal offenses
have no common essence, doctrinal analysts have not been
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able to give any discernible content to the contrasting
concept of motive. Thus their version of the motive is
irrelevant claim is true only tautologically, not
descriptively.
The motive is irrelevant maxim has somehow survived
a century of logical, descriptive and normative criticism.
Yet contemporary exponents of the maxim rarely specify
whether they mean the descriptively false utilitarian
version or the trivially true doctrinal version. The
utilitarian version is a critical principle, with law reform
implications over a wide range of issues. But these
implications flow from the counterintuitive principle that
an actor's purposes and values are irrelevant to her moral
responsibility for wrongdoing. On the other hand, because
the doctrinal version is always true by definition,
regardless of the criminal law's actual criteria of liability, it
can never have any doctrinal or policy implications. Its
role in legal argument is purely ornamental. Yet the
doctrinal version acquires an aura of substantiality from its
historic association with the utilitarian version, just as the
utilitarian version borrows some of the doctrinal version's
authority. Unsuited to survive on their own, the two
versions of the motive is irrelevant maxim sustain one
another, each disguising the other's failings.
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